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DAAG-PAP-A (M) (27 Sep 72) DAJD-OTT

18 October 1972

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Colonel Adolph L. Belser,
CO, 29th General Support Group, 17 July 1971 - 30 April 1972

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
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(Continued on page 2)

Verne L. Bowers
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Major General, USA
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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30 April 1972

AVCS SG CO

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report, (Colonel Adolph L. Belser),
RCS CSFOR-74

THRU: Commanding General
USASUPCOM, SCN
APO SF 96491

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
ATTN: DAFD-OTT
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

Debriefing Report by: Colonel Adolph L. Belser
Duty Assignment: Commanding Officer, 29th General Support Group
Inclusive Dates: 17 July 1971 thru 30 April 1972
Date of Report: 30 April 1972

1. Introduction. The purpose of this report is to reflect the operations and mission accomplishments of the 29th General Support Group during the report period. A determined effort has been made to keep this report devoid of tautology, repeating problem areas, solutions, accomplishments, and failures only in sections where emphasis is needed. Further, to render a complete report which may be used in future circumstances as a tool to avoid pitfalls, it will include shortcomings and problem areas not resolved satisfactorily as well as improvements initiated and missions accomplished. Subordinate units during the reporting period were:

79th Maintenance Battalion (GS)
91st Composite Service Battalion
185th Maintenance Battalion (DS)
266th Supply and Service Battalion

2. Operational Environment.

a. Area of Operations. The 29th General Support Group's area of

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operations included all of Military Region III, the four most northern provinces of Military Region IV and three specific locations in Military Region II. Group Headquarters was located at Long Binh. The area of operations for subordinate battalions was:

(1) 79th Maintenance Battalion (GS). The battalion was located at Long Binh. Smaller detachments operated as required at Bearcat, Vung Tau and Newport. Operational Teams operated as required throughout Military Regions III and IV and a portion of Military Region II.

(2) 91st Composite Service Battalion. Military Region III and parts of Military Region IV.

(3) 185th Maintenance Battalion (DS). The battalion provided direct support maintenance and Class IX supply to US and Free World forces in Military Region III in the Republic of Vietnam. The area presents the extremes of climatic conditions from a dry, dusty environment during the "Dry Season" (Oct - Apr) to a muddy, tropical environment during the "Monsoon Season" (May - Sep). An adequate road network was available for transportation of supplies and repair parts to major support bases at Cu Chi and Phu Loi. However, air transportation and on site repair were required at night defensive positions and fire support bases away from the major support bases due to the distance involved and inadequate or unsecured roads.

(4) 266th Supply and Service Battalion. This battalion provided Class I, II, III, and VII Supplies, Laundry, Bath, Graves Registration, Clothing Issue and Clothing Exchange Support to non-divisional troops located throughout Military Region III; Boa Loc, Camp Dillard, and the Phan Thiet (to include Whiskey Mountain) area in Military Region II; and the four (4) most northern provinces of Military Region IV.

b. Nature of the Enemy.

(1) 185th Maintenance Battalion. Passive and active enemy actions were encountered during the reported period. This battalion did not sustain any battle casualties during the reported period. Enemy action consisted primarily of attacks by fire upon Phu Loi and anti-personnel and equipment mines in the Tan Uyen area of operations.

(2) 266th Supply and Service Battalion. Active or passive contact with enemy during the period was negligible and no personnel of the battalion were wounded, killed, or declared missing as a result of enemy action or combat.

c. Local Governmental Activities. See paragraph 4e., Civil Affairs.

3. Command Relationships.

a. The USA Support Command, Saigon. During the entire tenure of command, 29th General Support Group was a subordinate unit of USASUPCOM, SGN for the performance of all required support missions. The command relationship with

this higher headquarters was outstanding.

b. Long Binh Post. The additional mission of perimeter defense was performed under the operational control of CO, Long Binh Post. 29th General Support Group was initially responsible for 43 perimeter fighting positions until 15 December 1971 after which the area of responsibility was reduced to 22 positions. Long Binh Post continually viewed the Group's primary mission as being one of perimeter defense. As a result, the support missions were successfully accomplished only through the most tenacious efforts by all members of the Group.

c. Subordinate Battalions. Subordinate Commanders were given mission requirements and then encouraged to exercise their leadership capability to its fullest. All officers within the Group received an individual orientation by the Group Commander on maximizing their application of initiative, imagination and instantaneous response.

4. Experiences in Command.

a. Concept of Operation. To insure that satisfactory support was in fact being rendered, the Group Commander, Battalion Commanders and principal staff officers made frequent liaison visits to all supported units to include MACV/CORDS Teams.

(1) 79th Maintenance Battalion. The 79th Maintenance Battalion has been the central working force in the withdrawal of the United States from Military Regions III and IV of the Republic of Vietnam. It has done so by accomplishing four vital and unique functional missions; Keystone, CC&S, Depot Retrograde, and General Support Maintenance, particularly in support of equipment transfers, from the United States Army to the armed forces of other nations. (Tab A and B). Through its Keystone facilities, the battalion has received, processed and distributed over one million items of equipment from withdrawing units since 1 July 1970. Thousands of pieces have also been generated by the other sources listed in Tab A, and were received either in Keystone, or the Collection, Classification and Salvage Activity. Equipment was inspected for serviceability, documentation verified, accountability maintained, and proper destinations determined for each item. Many items remained in-country to satisfy local needs or because economic considerations to preclude expending further funds on marginal or on equipment not longer required. Large quantities are however, retrograded to satisfy worldwide Army commitments. These must be identified, properly cleaned, preserved, packaged and shipped according to detailed instructions received from Inventory Control Center, Vietnam (ICCV). Among the items remaining in-country, a small quantity were SCRAM I and were issued against in-country requirements. The majority required various categories of maintenance, and the 79th Maintenance Battalion shops have, until recently, been deeply committed to upgrading depot stocks to permit their issue to US and Free World Military Forces. Other critical maintenance programs, particularly General Support of COMEL items and the direct support of transportation major items have been accomplished. During the period, a vital fifth mission, perimeter defense, often occupied from 25 to 50 percent of the available manpower. Mission accomplishment has been characterized by resourcefulness, flexibility and the "We'll Do It" attitude. Basic organizations have been examined and tailored on a continual basis to meet rapidly fluctuating workloads. The operating staff has been structured to provide a single officer for each functional mission area as an overall coordinator.

Subordinate operating units have received from or provided augmentation to each other, or from external sources, as required. Redeployment of the Royal Thai Army, for example, involved Keystone processing teams, maintenance rebuild lines, and retrograde receiving and processing facilities. As withdrawal has continued, civilian contractors have begun to assume the mission areas to maintain continuity and permit military withdrawals in keeping with national policy. The battalion has expeditiously transferred equipment, tools and facilities and assisted contractors to the maximum extent possible. Recently, it was charged with the responsibility of supervising the contracting officers' representatives and monitoring several civilian contracts. As contractors reach full capability, this responsibility is expected to be transferred and the future employment of the battalion then determined.

(2) 91st Composite Service Battalion. Within this organization, the Company Commanders operated under mission-type orders and policies established by Group as well as the Battalion Commander. Daily visits to the operational elements of the companies were conducted by the battalion staff to insure that these policies and orders were complied with. Frequent visits were also made to the company billet areas and mess halls to insure that all factors relating to troop health, welfare and morale were getting maximum attention. Much of the internal Battalion staff operation was left under the control of the Battalion Executive Officer to provide the commander the time necessary to conduct the daily visits to the company operations, to conduct liaison visits to the units being supported, and to perform the myriad of other administrative functions required of a commander.

(3) 185th Maintenance Battalion. The fixed maintenance facilities for all commodities repaired by the three subordinate companies were consolidated at Long Binh. Support of combat units away from Long Binh was provided by contact teams located at Phu Loi, Cu Chi, Tay Ninh and Tan Son Nhut. Equipment was repaired on site or evacuated back to the contact team depending on the extent of the repair involved, the location of the unserviceable equipment, availability of transportation (primarily air), or the urgency of need associated with the item of equipment. The fixed maintenance shops at Long Binh were commodity oriented by the cross attachment of skills between subordinate units and the hand receipt of equipment and tool sets.

(4) 266th Supply and Service Battalion. This command operated under the concept of recognizing the value of a modern volunteer army while realistically employing both officers and enlisted men, who were not volunteers, to accomplish a mission. Therefore, a tailored concept was adopted which attempted to explain "why" and "how" to the troops while maintaining discipline under a combat environment. This commander utilized his staff to the greatest extent possible. The Executive Officer was tasked with supervising the other battalion staff sections, monitoring correspondence flow, and overall internal operation of everyday battalion business. The commander visited as many operational and living areas as feasible. It was evident that much could be accomplished and learned by talking to the troops in their environment and not waiting for them to take advantage of the commander's open door policy. It was also a policy for the commander or a battalion staff officer to visit

outlying operational logistical support activities on a weekly basis.

b. Command and Control. Command was exercised by the Group Commander through the subordinate Battalion Commanders and a Headquarters and Headquarters Company Commander. All commanders were rated and indorsed by commander. The staff organization at Group level was of a directorate configuration. Directorates were established for Supply and Services, Security, Plans and Operations, and Maintenance. The S-1 functions were performed by a conventional staff.

(1) 79th Maintenance Battalion. The battalion had initially reported directly to USA Support Command Saigon. On 1 November 1971, it was attached to 29th General Support Group, to place all maintenance capabilities under the Group Commander. Keystone/Retrograde channels of communication have remained essentially the same. Staff sections function in the standard manner, with some exceptions. As is common to maintenance organizations, staff responsibility for direction of the technical mission rests with the Materiel Officer, not the S-3. A description of the Materiel Section is attached (Tab C). Not shown is the dual staff and line responsibility of the Keystone Officer. He is also required to supervise the equipment processing locations, including over 100 personnel. This is further complicated since augmentation of the sites is provided by the 604th CS Company, a unit not under the control of the battalion. A general support battalion headquarters detachment TOE does not have a full time company commander or first sergeant. The large Keystone augmentation to the detachment has strained the detachment administrative personnel, and required that a full time first sergeant be appointed.

(2) 91st Composite Service Battalion. With the exception of contact teams, all elements of this command were located on one post. As a result, few command and control problems were encountered. However, it should be noted that companies with more than 225 men assigned become marginal from the standpoint of command control with the normal reduced staffing caused by short tour turbulence. It is therefore recommended that companies of this size at least be authorized an executive officer to assist the company commander and that the assignment of supervisory personnel have a high priority.

(3) 185th Maintenance Battalion.

(a) Command was exercised by the Battalion Commander through the subordinate Company Commanders and the one Detachment Commander. Within the companies heavy reliance was placed upon the Non-Commissioned Officer Chain of Command. The contact teams were commanded by an OIC or NCOIC who reported directly to the Company Commander. Contact team personnel assigned to a company other than the company having command of the contact team were attached for all purposes to include administration under the authority of the UCMJ.

(b) Control of the mission effort was centralized in the Materiel Office of the Battalion Staff. Control was exercised by the assignment of priorities and short term projects and the cross-leveling of personnel and equipment between the companies. Control was effected through the shop office of each company with the exception of the Technical Supply and the Electronics Maintenance Platoon where the Materiel Office dealt directly with the Technical Supply Platoon Leader and the Electronics Maintenance Platoon Leader. Comprehensive production reports and supply performance reports were monitored daily by the Battalion Commander and staff at a morning staff call.

(4) 266th Supply and Service Battalion. The commander maintained knowledge of events through daily staff conferences and a weekly commander's conference. Further, contact with company and LSA commanders on a daily or "when needed" basis permitted necessary command coordination. The commander rated each of his subordinate commanders. This permits and encourages each commander to seek maximum exposure direct with the battalion commander in accomplishing his mission. This battalion recognized both success and shortcomings within it. That is evidenced by a sharp increase in awards presented during the report period, a sharp increase in Field Grade Article 15's, eliminations under AR 635-212 and AR 635-200, and pretrial confinements. (See paragraph 4h(3), discipline, law, and order).

c. Techniques of Employment.

(1) 79th Maintenance Battalion.

(a) Keystone.

1 The Keystone activity is staffed by an augmentation to the headquarters detachment, and supervised by the Keystone Project Officer, a member of the Materiel Office. The two basic receiving activities are the multiple items processing point (MIPP) and the single items processing point (SIPP) located at Long Binh. The latter receives primarily log book type items, while the former processes small arms, TA-50, post, camp and static, COMTEL, chemical, and quartermaster sets, kits and outfits. Keystone units, and certain other customers, turn-in SCRAM I-IV material at those locations.

2 To lend perspective, consider Keystone Robin during which the major US forces stood down in military regions III and IV. During the three phases lasting from 1 July 1970 to 30 April 1971, over 877,700 items were received for an average over 87,700 per month. The inventory adjustments for each phase were:

<u>PHASE</u>	<u>LINES ADJUSTED</u>	<u>NET ADJUSTMENT</u>
Robin Alpha	445	\$224,711.37
Robin Bravo	458	538,725.41
Robin Charlie	181	177,307.05

3 Keystone Oriole began 1 May 1971 and progressed in three phases until 30 November 1971. During Oriole, over 129,200 items were processed for a monthly average of 18,500. By implementing more stringent accountability procedures, inventory adjustments were significantly reduced as shown:

<u>PHASE</u>	<u>LINE ADJUSTED</u>	<u>NET ADJUSTMENT</u>
Oriole Alpha	3	\$2,715.13
Oriole Bravo	2	5,487.00
Oriole Charlie	17	9,192.31

The lines adjusted dropped from an average of 0.11% during Robin to 0.02% for Oriole. a six fold increase in accuracy.

During Keystone Oriole, the 5th Increment of the redeployment of the Royal Thai Army took place. The 79th Maintenance Battalion was tasked with, among other things, processing MIPP type equipment for these allied forces at their base camps. A seven man multiple items processing point team, composed of personnel from the Keystone activity at Long Binh, was assigned on 17 June and completed 19 August 1971. An officer was provided to perform a joint US-Thai inventory. A total of 37 units were processed, and 643 conexes, 36 crates and eight other boxes shipped. Overall, during the Keystone Oriole, 485 units were serviced and over 129,200 total items received of which 4,265 were principal items processed through SIPP.

4 A new phase commenced 1 December 1971 with Keystone Mallard. In November, USA Support Command, Saigon considered the establishment of a small, second washing facility at Vung Tau. Personnel from 79th Maintenance Battalion were called upon to assist in planning. About 1 December, the battalion was required to establish a receiving and documentation activity for both Keystone and CC&S customers at Vung Tau. Water blaster machines and mechanics were and continue to be provided for that operation. The two month long Mallard increment processed 67,384 items, at a monthly rate almost double that of Oriole. To expeditiously transfer quantities of post, camp and station property to on-site ARVN units, mini-MIPP teams were organized, and made over 20 trips to base camps in Military Regions III and IV. During Mallard, the sixth increment of the Royal Thai Army redeployed. Another MIPP team was established at their base camp on 7 December 1971 and withdrawn on 30 January 1972. Due to an increased workload, twelve men were used. During this period, 48 units deployed and 804 conexes of MIPP items, 210 conexes of personal affects, 74 conexes of ASL, and 112 boxes of MIPP items were processed and packed. During Keystone Mallard, over 170 units were serviced, and 67,384 pieces received of which 3,887 were SIPP items.

5 The pace of troop withdrawals has accelerated and Keystone Owl tells the tale. Beginning 1 February, this increment is scheduled to have over 270 units involved. With about 75% of the inventories in, a total of 244,435 items can be expected, of which 26,205 had been received by 23 March. This monthly rate of 72,116 items is of the same magnitude as the Robin increments and almost four times greater than the Oriole increment of three months ago.

6 The Vinnel Corporation has accepted a contract to assume the Keystone mission and is currently phasing in its personnel. The contractor is expected to be fully operational by 15 April 1972.

(b) Retrograde

1 The Collection, Classification and Salvage Activity receives and ships Class VII and IX unserviceable items in all commodities except medical, COMSEC, ammunition, and aircraft peculiar items. It operates a disassembly and cannibalization activity for the return of recoverable or required items to the supply system, captured enemy and recaptured US weapons turn-in point, and also cleans equipment, particularly vehicular, to pass military quarantine inspection standards established by the US Department of Agriculture before movement off shore. It provides the latter service for its own receipts, for Keystone retrograde, and for depot excess.

2 In early 1971, it was decided to civilianize the CC&S company.

The unit was reorganized around the TOE base of the 567th Transportation Terminal Service Company and authorized 70 military and 250 local nationals. The concept was commendable, but impractical, for the wage scale proved insufficient to attract the proper quantity and quality of skills. The folly became evident about July, when the impact of the fifth Thai increment redeployment was felt.

3 Beginning in May, the Thais turned in to CC&S close to 1,000 SCRAM III and IV items for retrograde. These were processed in the normal manner, with many going across the wash rack prior to retrograde off shore. Starting in June, approximately 1,100 serviceable Thai vehicles were also processed and washed for shipment to Thailand. This workload was too great for the crippled organization to handle, and the backlog began to rise. Prompt remedial steps were undertaken by the battalion. Men from many different shops in the battalion were assigned to the washrack to counter the problem. Personnel augmentation was requested and received from Support Command.

4 Receipts have continued to increase each month. Anticipating this phenomenon, the battalion prepared several studies to inform higher headquarters of the personnel and material requirements to move larger quantities of equipment. Simultaneously, internal methods were improved and efficiency increased within available resources. Washing operations were expanded to four, six-hour shifts, resulting in increased production due to lessened fatigue on operators, and decreased machine "dead time". The maintenance support of water blasters was reorganized, with sole responsibility for organizational and direct support maintenance resting with one man. Systematic rotation of each machine for maintenance was instituted, and mechanics are not on the wash rack 24 hours per day. Down time on water blasters has been dramatically reduced. As a result, 7,800 principle items were received, and 7,995 vehicles were shipped from the retrograde facilities from 1 November 1971 to 15 March 1972. This is of the same magnitude of equipment as was shipped in the nine months preceding November, and thus reflects a 100% increase in production in the last few months. Efficiency was so good that during February, the wash rack was closed for 14 shifts because the backlog was reduced to zero.

5 During the period 1 July 1971 to 17 September 1971, the 79th Maintenance Battalion processed in excess of 100 "Home Run Extended" vehicles at a cost of over 2,400 manhours. This was a high priority program designed to accelerate the screening of excess in Vietnam for possible utilization by Federal Agencies and authorized donees in the United States.

6 The Long Binh wash rack is not the entire retrograde story. A small facility is operated 24 hours daily at the Newport terminal area to rewash the few items which may fail MQI standards. By locating this facility at the port, the movement momentum is not lost at Long Binh, and dirt picked up in transit can be easily removed. During January, the team washed over 420 pieces of equipment, and in February, 1,812 bundles of US Air Force airfield matting was processed for off shore shipment.

7 The 567th Trans/LB CC&S also processed large quantities of communication, armament and chemical equipment for retrograde. From 1 November 1971 to 15 March 1972, 6,135 chemical, 363 fire control, and 5,152 signal items as well as 4,621 US and 367 foreign weapons were accepted, preserved, packed and retrograded by the armament and signal section. Meanwhile, the disassembly platoon removed over six hundred recoverable assemblies from PDO candidate vehicles, and shipped them to rebuild facilities located in-country

and off shore. Throughout the period, the CC&S activity provided teams to work at property disposal to verify asset condition and identify those items that were recoverable. Since August, for example, over 90 vehicles were found and approximately 60% of these were removed from PDO, and returned to rebuild facilities.

(c) Maintenance.

1 General. 632nd HEM Co provided maintenance capability, primarily in the upgrade of depot stocks for subsequent transfer to customers, for automotive, engineer, small arms and artillery, fire control and instrument, and allied trades. The 147th LEM Co, augmented by the 60th Engineer Detachment, furnished DS and GS level maintenance for COMTEL, Special Electronic Devices, FADAC and other low density sophisticated equipment including high pressure water blasters.

2 As mentioned above, the redeployment of the fifth increment of the Royal Thai Army took place in the April-August 1971 time frame. In addition to the Keystone and retrograde missions, the battalion was tasked with upgrading vehicles to replace the SCRAM III and IV assets which the Thais had turned in previously. Initial program requirements of 946 were furnished in April, and assets were located in depot by battalion personnel or received from the Keystone processing location. The completion date for the program was set at 22 August. Beginning 29 June, a total of five changes to program requirements were made, with the final change being on 7 August. These changes resulted from an uncertainty by the Thais and higher headquarters as to what the actual SCRAM III and IV requirements were initially. To complicate matters further, the Thais ceased receiving on 14 August in order to provide their personnel with additional time for personal matters. Despite the fluid situation, of the final requirement of 809 vehicles, the battalion was able to identify 785 vehicles for repair, and repair 782 of them by the 14th of August. The remaining three, 3/4 ton trucks required engines, which were not available. In addition to mechanical repair, the 632nd HEM Co completed body and paintwork on the Thai SCRAM I and II vehicles previously repaired by another battalion. A total of 1,217 vehicles were painted in a three month period. Because of the abrupt departure of the Thais, approximately 250 vehicles were left in the wash rack area and had to be moved to port. The battalion assumed responsibility for the equipment, maintained it, repaired it as necessary, and arranged for its movement to port.

3 Beginning about 7 November 1970, the battalion began upgrading equipment for transfer to ARVN. During the Thai program, the vehicular portion of ARVN transfer was reduced, but not totally eliminated. In fact from 7 November 1970 to 15 August 1971, the battalion transferred to the ARVN, 1,135 vehicles, 4,048 small arms, 47 engineer items and 1,691 COMTEL items of equipment. During this period, the 79th Maintenance Battalion established good working relations with the ARVN inspectors. The rejection rate for completed work was extremely low because inspectors were allowed to conduct on-site inspections and spot corrections.

4 On 16 August 1971, the transfer of equipment was redesignated Project 981 and increased in magnitude. Members of the battalion staff provided

guidance to USARV DCSLOG on repair parts required for large scale production repair, man hour experience data, and guidance in ARVN acceptance standards. About this time, USARV tasked the 79th Maintenance Battalion with repairing M43A1 "Dusters" to be used in the anti-aircraft role. This was a significant undertaking, since the weapons system had only been used for ground support in Vietnam, and no expertise existed in-country for proper fire-control repair. Based on a sample inspection of three vehicles a repair parts bill of materials was requisitioned. By early September, only 10% of the repair parts had been received. To complete the program on schedule, the 79th Maintenance Battalion obtained authority to cannibalize, under controlled conditions, five "Dusters" and began its production line. The line method was used to enable each crew at one of six stations to be trained in a single aspect of repair on the unfamiliar equipment. Using this method, all twelve "Dusters" were completed and accepted by ARVN within four weeks, despite the fact that only 30% of the repair parts were ever received through normal supply channels.

5 At the end of August 1971, the command was notified that a civilian contractor would assume the mission of the Battalion's Maintenance Shops. The battalion immediately formulated an implementation plan to minimize disruption of production during the change over. In late September however, various alternatives were being studied by Support Command to keep the maintenance potential of the 79th intact. In the end, the contractor received two thirds of our facilities and all available tools and publications he desired. The transfer of equipment, and backlog of over 400 COMTEL, armament and 150 automotive jobs was accomplished within 20 days. The men of the battalion assisted the contractor in operation of those sections in which he did not have immediate full capability, and as a result uninterrupted maintenance capability was furnished throughout the critical period.

6 The two maintenance companies still retained some Project 981 work at this point, but by and large, the contractor had assumed the bulk of that mission, leaving the automotive capability of the HEM Company available. Saigon Support Command directed this capability towards its most critical problem: Improving the maintenance posture of the 4th Transportation Command. The 5 ton tractor deadline was about 40% when the 79th Maintenance Battalion assumed direct support in late November. A few weeks before, the 632nd had commenced Project ZCN, whose purpose was to upgrade 5 ton tractors from depot stock for issue to the 4th TC. The Backlog initially rose rapidly as vehicles were transferred from the former maintenance unit. The problem remained constant due to a lack of repair parts. Since the battalion no longer had its own tech supply, it was dependent upon others for material release expediter (MRE) support. It had attempted to obtain MRE authorization for months to no avail. Finally in January, at the direction of BG Vance, three MRE's were appointed. In four weeks, the backlog plummeted, and about 1 March, the total deadline fell to less than 10%, the lowest rate on record. As early as August 1971, the battalion recommended that Support Command determine vehicular requirements for the sixth increment to the Thais redeployment so production could begin about October. Uncertainty as to the source of replacements delayed a decision, and finally in January, quotas were given to Vinnell and the 79th Maintenance Battalion. Of a requirement for 365 trailers, the battalion located in depot 308 and within six weeks repaired 250 of them. On 1 March, the 5 ton tractor and Thai trailer missions were transferred to Vinnell along with the remaining shop and most of the remaining tools of the 632nd HEM Co. The 632nd HEM Co moved to a small shop

in another area and is presently phasing out along with the 147th IEM Co.

(2) 91st Composite Service Battalion. Support to the customer was provided from a garrison type Direct Support Shop facility; however, contact teams were employed as the situation dictated. These teams were headed by a Warrant Officer and contained 10-15 men. Until October 1971 this battalion operated a consolidated Class IX Tech Supply in support of its customers, its shops, and the shops of the 79th Maint Bn. In October 1971 the Tech Supply facility was transferred to the Vinnell Corporation for operation under the Fixed Field Maintenance Contract.

(3) 185th Maintenance Battalion. The fixed facility at Long Binh received Direct Support orders from customers in the Long Binh/Saigon/Bien Hoa area. Job ordered equipment was normally evacuated to the fixed facility because of the adequate road network and proximity of the customer. General Support job orders from Long Binh Depot were also received at the fixed facility. Customers in the Phu Loi/Lai Khe/Di An and Cu Chi areas were supported by a fourteen man contact team initially split between Cu Chi and Phu Loi and later consolidated on 19 Dec 71 at Phu Loi. Contact teams based at Long Binh, and deployed as required by air, were used to support MACV and CORDS teams at outlying areas throughout MR III. On 15 December support of the MACV/CORDS teams became the responsibility of the 91st CS Bn at which time the 185th Maintenance Battalion provided Communications and Electronics (COMTEL) repairmen to the 91st CS Battalion's teams. While many COMTEL jobs were performed on site, the majority of the electronics repair was accomplished at the fixed facility at Long Binh where adequate power and test facilities were available. The consolidated Technical Supply of the 185th Main Support Company provided Class IX for all supported customers and all of the shops and contact teams of the battalion. An ASL of approximately 5,000 lines in November 1971 was reduced to 2,900 lines by 1 February 1972 due to the loss of customers and refinement and recomputation of demands.

(4) 266th Supply and Service Battalion. The varied missions and scattered locations of the units of this battalion required the employment of various techniques. These are explained as follows:

(a) Condiment Issue: Visits made to outlying Logistical Support Activities early during the reporting period repeatedly revealed that supported customers were continually running short of popular condiment items. Investigation and analysis of the problem revealed a lack of understanding of condiment order procedures by unit mess personnel and a break in the condiment supply pipeline caused by the order and ship time of condiments to the isolated LSA's. A seven day time lag existed between the time the need for condiments was recognized until the arrival of the condiments at the supply point. This problem was solved by placing a ten day supply of popular condiments in stock at each activity. Units were issued from these stocks and the ten day level was reestablished by each subsequent convoy. Further, Class I personnel were sent to each supported activity to teach mess personnel the proper procedures for ordering condiments.

(b) Air Tailgate Deliveries: During the reporting period this battalion was tasked to provide Class I support to four (4) MACV teams by means of air delivery. Successful accomplishment of this task depended upon constant coordination with major units or activities involved, timing, cooperation, and luck. The concept of operation in this mission is for the Class I personnel of

this battalion to identify rations, both wets and drys, the afternoon prior to the morning they were to be shipped. The rations to be shipped were determined from a ration request submitted to Class I operations seven days in advance of the scheduled shipment. Shipments were scheduled Monday, Wednesday, and Friday mornings. Dry rations were actually selected and palletized the night before shipment. Wet rations were selected early the following morning and transported to the air strip in the refrigerated van, while dry rations were transported in organic 2½ ton trucks. Once at the air strip, the wet rations were palletized and both wet and dry rations were weighed. Once the aircraft had been designated, the rations were loaded by Air Force personnel. While the aircraft was enroute, the pilot radioed an ETA to the receiving MACV team. A courier with necessary documentation from the Class I point accompanied each flight. Upon landing, the aircraft was met by MACV team mess personnel and while the rations were being off loaded, the courier and MACV mess representative inventoried the supplies using the documents provided. The MACV mess representatives provided the courier with the next week's ration request and signed a receipt for the delivery. Ideally, the aircraft was on the ground less than 30 minutes. Problems encountered in the tailgate delivery system were:

1 Personnel utilized to perform the mission were not authorized by TOE, MTOE, or TDA therefore requiring that they be diverted from the regular Class I mission.

2 Inadequate coordination was experienced between operating elements, i.e. the supporting battalion, the supported unit, and the Air Force. Each of the above elements were cognizant of the importance of this mission; yet, each were guilty of failure to perform or react in some instances. Specific failures were:

a 266th S&S Bn:

i Failure to supply the rations ordered.

ii Late arrivals at the air strip, thus failing to meet schedules.

iii Improper documentation in accounting for rations.

iv Improper supervision of the personnel assigned the mission.

b Supported MACV Teams:

i Failure to meet the aircraft at destination.

ii Failure to conduct proper investigation of inventories and later complained of ration shortages.

iii Failure to submit timely ration requests.

iv Failure to report over shipment.

c Air Force:

i Unnecessary delay in departure after rations were loaded.

ii Impatience of pilots during groundtime. This prevented proper inventory.

iii Unavoidable maintenance delays.

3 The solutions to these problems can be summed up in two words - Supervision and Coordination. The battalion took the following steps to overcome its internal problem in accomplishing the mission:

a A tailgate section was organized, trained and given the sole mission of insuring that the rations were selected, transported, loaded, flown, delivered and accounted for. This team, though not authorized by TCE, thoroughly understood its responsibility. Further, an officer was assigned as OIC of the tailgate section, and a Battalion Staff Officer was given staff supervision responsibility for this mission. He or another staff officer accompanied the mission at least once each two week period.

b Coordination meetings were conducted on a frequent basis to determine problem areas and how best to solve them. An officer from the 29th Group Staff visited the supported MACV teams frequently. To date this operation has been carried out most effectively.

(c) Ration Delivery by Convoy:

1 During the reported period, rations were also delivered to supported units at Dong Tam, Tay Ninh, Phan Thiet, Bao Loc, and Camp Dillard by means of truck convoy. Problem areas encountered were similar to those in air shipment - coordination and supervision. Coordination with TMA/MCC, the organization responsible for scheduling transportation, and the Long Binh Depot was essential to insure timely scheduling of transportation and the provision of perishable Class I supplies direct from the depot to the supported units. Specific problem areas encountered were:

a 4th Transportation Command vehicles failing to arrive at the Class I yard in sufficient time to load and depart with the scheduled convoy.

b Insufficient numbers of 4th TC vehicles to transport the needed amounts of Class I supplies to supported units or ISA's.

c Drivers of the reefer trucks turning off the reefer units due to noise, thus allowing perishable rations to partially thaw or melt enroute. Also inoperative reefer units were often provided for Class I convoys.

d Late submission of ration requests by supported units resulting in delayed delivery of rations.

2 Again, through intense coordination with depot, 4th TC, TMA/MCC and supported units, problems were minimized. Of particular significance, however, is the fact that where multiple units are receiving rations where only a breakdown site exists, it is important that at least one representative of the supporting unit be available to participate in breaking down the rations for insuring that each customer receives the proper issue. By attaching this representative to the largest of the supported units in the remote area, the battalion has solved many of its problems. Further, by frequent coordination

visits to the field, the customers have been able to keep in close contact with the command elements of the battalion and solve many problems through these contacts.

d. Intelligence.

(1) Collection. Intelligence gathered by Group personnel in the field was processed through the supported unit. Intelligence gathered in the Long Binh area was processed through Long Binh Post. Because of the nature of operations and the subordinate battalions' missions, the Group did not conduct an active intelligence collection program but instead relied upon Long Binh Post, and the Third Regional Assistance Command (TRAC) for intelligence reports. Reports received from TRAC were generally current within 48 hours, however, reports from Long Binh were usually three to five days old and of little use for planning purposes.

(2) Use. Spot reports and intelligence summaries were used to brief perimeter guards, increase the defensive measures associated with vehicular traffic to and from remote activities, and to establish priorities and urgency of need associated with customers' equipment in the subordinate battalions' maintenance shops.

e. Counterintelligence. Due to the nature of the Group's mission, activities in this area were limited to the training and enforcement of procedures to reduce the release of friendly intelligence information. No serious breaches of security were encountered during the reporting period.

f. Training.

(1) CONUS.

(a) 91st Composite Service Battalion. Replacements received from CONUS who arrived for their first duty assignment following their school training, on the whole were incapable of performing their missions until they received further training. Hence, on the job training of these personnel was a necessity before they actually became mission qualified.

(b) 185th Maintenance Battalion. The technical training received by the replacements in CONUS was outstanding. Training received in CONUS by first term soldiers in the care, preservation, and employment of individual and crew served weapons was not sufficient. Training, military courtesy and appearance appeared to be adequate but would have quickly been eroded by the Vietnam environment without continuous emphasis and training.

(2) In-country.

(a) 79th Maintenance Battalion.

1 Due to the magnitude of the 79th Maintenance Battalion's mission, well trained personnel have received their training for their specific jobs from MOS producing schools and facilities in CONUS. However, the diversity of the missions has necessitated some in-country training.

1 To keep concerned personnel abreast of the provisions of the

Uniform Code of Military Justice mandatory classes on that subject were presented periodically. Attendance was checked and records maintained to insure that all required personnel received this training.

ii To increase versatility in both related and unrelated skills, the 79th has pursued a system of on-the-job training and buddy training. These programs have proven invaluable to the accomplishment of the mission, especially in areas where no MOS skill is available such as waterblasters.

iii In some instances the 79th, as a result of mission requirements, developed expertise in areas where no training facilities existed in CONUS or Vietnam, i.e. waterblaster maintenance. Using personnel qualified in mechanical skills and through a program of combined training, the necessary expertise was developed in waterblaster maintenance.

2 The 79th, as a result of its unique training system, has been tasked on several occasions to train local nationals and third country nationals in certain skill areas i.e., through a system of OJT, the 79th has trained local nationals employed by the Vinnell Corporation, to perform in jobs that were soon to be vacated by the US Military and assumed by the Vinnell Corporation.

3 The 79th was also tasked to provide a four week course in radio repair to selected personnel from the Cambodian Navy. Utilizing our own experienced personnel, and OJT system was utilized and superior results obtained.

(2) 91st Composite Service Battalion. About one-fifth of the MOS qualified personnel needed to administer most units were not available. This problem was aggravated further as the phase-down began and personnel were redeployed without regard to MOS. These shortages of MOS qualified personnel caused a requirement for extensive OJT programs.

(3) 185th Maintenance Battalion. Training in-country consisted primarily of on-the-job training to expand basic MOS skills and cross training into related skills where shortages existed. Extensive training was required and provided in use of individual and crew served weapons, interior guard, and small unit tactics in support of the local defense of Long Binh Post. Refresher NCO leadership courses were provided by Saigon Support Command and were helpful in training rapidly promoted junior NCO's.

(4) 266th Supply and Service Battalion. Most training accomplished is of the on-the-job type necessitated by assignment to the battalion of in-country transfers who were not trained in a supply or service MOS. Specific training accomplished included familiarization fire with M-16, M-60, and M-79 weapons on a quarterly basis, and small unit tactics for members of the battalion reaction force.

g. Organization. The 29th General Support Group's organizational structure evolved as explained below:

(1) Group organization diagram as of 1 Nov 71 is reflected at Tab D.

(2) Group organization diagram as of 28 Jan 72 is reflected at Tab E.

(3) Major reorganization changes were effected during the early part of Feb 72. Missions previously conducted by the 185th Maintenance Battalion were transferred with personnel and equipment, to the 91st CS Bn in accordance with a Group "Maintenance Module" Plan. The resultant organization diagram is reflected at Tab F.

(4) Additional "Maintenance Module" shifts were effected later in Feb 72. The 266th Composite Service Battalion (Provisional) was activated and absorbed those missions previously conducted by the 91st Composite Service Battalion, and the 266th Supply and Service Battalion. The resultant organization diagram is reflected at Tab G.

h. Personnel Management.

(1) Maintenance of unit strength.

(a) 79th Maintenance Battalion. The strength of the 79th Maintenance Battalion has varied considerably in the reporting period. With the different missions assigned and the personnel turbulence caused by short tour policies, it was difficult to maintain an even balance of military personnel. The local national strength has remained relatively constant.

(b) 91st Composite Service Battalion. Generally speaking, this command was maintained at the proper strength. However, NCO's, E-6 and above, remained far below authorized levels. Mission performance in the areas of supply (MOS 76Y) and automotive maintenance (MOS 63C and H) suffered because of the shortage of qualified NCO's. Another problem of equal importance was that as supported units withdrew the requirement for Warrant Officers in the armament and service evacuation functional areas lessened. So that these Warrant Officers could be gainfully employed, there were instances where they performed in other than their primary MOS's. This action was taken as a last resort, but it proved that WO's could be employed in much the same manner as Commissioned Officers, despite MOS and grade. It is felt that WO's so employed have gained in proficiency and knowledge because of these new experiences.

(c) 185th Maintenance Battalion. The battalion had an authorized strength of 679 officers and enlisted men throughout the reported period. Due to the sparse influx of new personnel and the accelerated loss of personnel associated with the drawdown of forces in RVN, the battalion strength dropped from 550 in November 1971 to 320 by 1 February 1972. The shortage of officers and NCO's would have been critical had not the battalion consolidated the three companies into one during this time frame.

(d) 266th Supply and Service Battalion. In addition to the inherent turbulence created by a 12 month tour, and standdowns, and/or draw downs of US forces have created an even greater turbulence. The assigned strength of this battalion has presented a deceiving picture during the reported period because of assigned missions which were accomplished without authorized personnel.

(2) Morale, health, welfare and drug awareness. 29th Group initiated intensive and unique programs to infuse real meanings into prime areas of concern.

(a) Group Programs.

1 "Operation Stand Closer to Your Men". (Tab H). This program provided each enlisted member of the command with an immediate arrival briefing conducted by his company commander and first sergeant. Included in the briefings was information concerning his job, drug awareness, and policies of the unit. In addition, each man's next of kin was sent a personal letter from the Battalion Commander, relating the soldier's duty assignment, his address and the relative safety and security that he enjoyed. A sample letter is at Tab I.

2 "Operation Sound Off". (Tab J). This program provided each officer and soldier of the command with the opportunity to express questions, complaints or suggestions for improvement concerning any Group function or condition deemed important by the participant. These "Sound Offs" could be presented to any commander and/or staff officer within the Group either in person or in writing on a preprinted, preaddressed "Sound Off" form, with the confidentiality of the communications guaranteed. Response by the troops was enlightening and most helpful in enhancing morale and welfare.

3 Frequent inspections of troop billets, mess halls, and recreational facilities were conducted by commanders at all levels. Upgrading of these facilities never ended with the result that the Group became widely recognized for excellence in providing for its men.

4 Drug awareness teams were formed and functioned within each battalion. The overall program was supervised by a Group Drug Awareness Officer who was responsible directly to the Group Executive Officer. Significant strides were made in troop education through briefings and relaxed "rap sessions" resulting in the plummeting of drug offenses.

(b) Battalion Activity.

1 79th Maintenance Battalion. Drug abuse within the battalion has never reached a critical stage. The mission of the battalion has never been hindered by drug abuse as evidenced by the number of men requesting amnesty and those showing positive results in mandatory urinalysis tests.

Amnesty: May 71 - Mar 72 -- 16 personnel.

Positive Urinalysis: Oct 71 - Mar 72 -- 52 personnel,
total personnel tested was 1,739.

2 91st Composite Service Battalion. The unannounced unit urinalysis has proved, in this battalion, to be the single most powerful incentive for the soldier to discontinue the use of hard drugs. In addition, an R&R center was established within the battalion. Facilities included, ping-pong, pool, weight-

lifting, stereo listening room, television room, library and games room, snack bar, basketball, horseshoes and evening movies. The degree of success that this "center" experienced as a deterrent against drug abuse cannot be statistically measured. However, the "center" has contributed toward lessening one aspect of the drug abuse environment -- boredom.

3 185th Maintenance Battalion.

a Morale. Morale was surprisingly high considering the turbulence that each unit experienced in drawing down and consolidating. The man who was sometimes overloaded, such as the members of the contact teams, seemed to always have the highest morale. Morale reached its lowest level when the man felt he no longer had a meaningful task directly related to the unit mission. As stated before, the principal task of each member of the chain of command became one of insuring that the men were meaningfully employed without creating "make work". When opportunities for leisure time became available it was best to offer activities such as boat trips on the Saigon river, weekend passes to Vung Tau, athletic contests, battalion field days, company parties, etc., rather than leaving the soldier to his own devices.

b Health. Malaria and other contagious diseases were almost non-existent with the exception of five cases of hepatitis. The source of the hepatitis was never clearly established, the cases were quickly treated, and no further cases were experienced. Lost time due to sick call was never a problem in the battalion.

c Welfare. An excellent paperback library was provided in the unit's dayrooms and the Battalion Coffeehouse. A battalion program provided individual rooms for each member of the battalion on a self-help basis. The individual rooms helped to contain the spread of contagious diseases, provided an individually decorated area of privacy, and helped to reduce barracks larceny. The 29th General Support Group "Stand Closer to Your Men" program encouraged each member of the chain of command to get to know and quickly solve any problem of adjustment, pay, etc., that the individual member might encounter. An enlisted sponsor of equal rank was assigned to each new member to facilitate his entry into the company and his section. The cardinal rule was that each new man would be absorbed into a meaningful job as quickly as possible after assignment. The importance of the chain of command in providing a free flow of information and assistance, both up and down, was continually stressed. To augment this channel, Junior EM Councils met at company and battalion level to exchange ideas between the commander and the enlisted representatives. Many suggestions that originated from these meetings became the basis for battalion programs and policies. The meetings were particularly important in keeping the enlisted members of the battalion informed regarding current and future reorganizations within the battalion. The "Sound Off" program provided each member an opportunity to write directly to the Company, Battalion, or Group Commander regarding any problem. These problems were promptly answered in writing or in a personal interview at the discretion of the writer. While problems could be put forth in a confidential manner if the writer so desired, the chain of command was appropriately tasked to resolve the problem and draft the answer for the Commander's signature. While problems were experienced in the responsiveness of the chain of commands

within the companies each member was confident that a mechanism was available to air and resolve his personal problems.

d Drug Awareness. The 100% unit urinalysis coupled with a firm policy regarding "pushers or users" who failed to respond to rehabilitation, made the hard drug (heroin) problem manageable prior to November 1971. The urinalysis provides an effective mechanism to identify the hard drug user. The Drug Treatment Center provides a sterile environment for detoxification prior to reentry into the unit. Each unit provided a "safe house" or controlled environment in which the member received individual counseling and a five to seven day transition period prior to return to his former job and peers on an initial part time basis. Each month the identified user received a follow up urinalysis to confirm the effectiveness of his rehabilitation effort. A second positive indication of drug abuse was normally grounds for speedy removal from the unit and subsequent removal from the service with a less than honorable discharge. The thrust of the program was that the unit would provide every assistance in an individual's rehabilitation effort, but that rehabilitation was the individual's responsibility. Once drug detection became effective peer pressure was directed toward the uniformed "pusher". Soldiers informed or fellow soldiers and the "pusher" was subject to prompt and effective disciplinary action in terms of long confinement and heavy fines. The battalion hard drug usage dropped from over 8% in September to less than 1% in January based on unit urinalysis results. While effective against hard drugs, the urinalysis did not provide an effective deterrent against marijuana. The effort against marijuana abuse consisted primarily of relieving the boredom of a Vietnam tour by insuring that everyone had a meaningful full time job and recreational programs to fill leisure time. Counseling consisted of "rap sessions", unit classes by USARV and Saigon Support Command awareness teams, and individual interviews with known or suspected users. Effective peer pressure was directed toward heroin or the indiscriminate use of marijuana. Marijuana, and other "soft drugs", continue to be used by members of the battalion and will continue until an effective detection method, such as the urinalysis, is available. Meanwhile, the problem is contained by attacking the problems of boredom and exertion of peer pressure.

4 266th Composite Service Battalion.

a Morale. The morale of the troops suffered because of the fact they were at Long Binh. The proximity to Saigon and knowledge of the fact that Saigon was on-limits to personnel stationed there was the largest negative morale problem in the battalion. Weekend trips to Vung Tau, R&R, CONUS leave, nightly movies, etc., did little to off-set the morale breaker of not being able to get to Saigon. Troops assigned to the Battalion Logistical Support Activities away from Long Binh or at Nha Be constantly had fewer morale problems although they did not have the comfort of on-post facilities available at Long Binh. Morale was enhanced to the extent possible by nightly movies, billet upgrade to include two man rooms where possible, Friday night boxing matches, NCO Club with attached EM Club covered patio, maximum R&R participation both in-country and out of country, and through personal care for the morale of the individual soldier through a program initiated by 29th General Support Group entitled "Stand Closer to Your Men".

b Health and welfare. Dispensary and hospital support for the battalion

was provided by the 24th Evac Hospital. It was the policy of the command for the battalion commanding officer to visit each member of the command in the hospital. Further, the battalion chaplain visited the hospital on a daily basis. Also battalion personnel confined to the Long Binh Stockade are visited on a weekly basis by their company commander or a company officer. The battalion chaplain is utilized as the eyes and ears of the commander and reported morale trends directly to the CO. Again the "Stand Closer to Your Men" program and the "Sound Off" program assisted greatly in supporting the welfare of troops within this battalion.

c Drug Awareness. This is the one area which can be stated as being the largest problem encountered during the report period. Yet, it can further be identified as the area in which the greatest strides were taken to overcome the problem. At the beginning of the report period, the drug abuse problem was nearing its peak. The usage of hard drugs had increased steadily without proper problem recognition or analysis and without proportionate disciplinary "teeth" to permit local commanders to counter its rise. Drug abusers were permitted to remain on the job with no action taken against them unless they were apprehended with drugs in their possession or pushing drugs. Many cases were dropped because of improper search and seizure techniques utilized by unfamiliar commanders. Drug abuse generated such by-products as mugging, barracks thievery, robbery, and AWOLs. Further, drug abuse created a morale problem within the battalion because the "straights", or non-users, were required to carry the additional workload created by the drug abusers' non-performance. The major impact in reducing the drug problem was the initiation of the involuntary urinalysis test and the hard line taken by USAJUPCOM, SGN in dealing with identified drug abusers. This program "took the wind" from the problem and reduced drug abuse to a manageable level. In addition and complimentary to the involuntary urinalysis is USAJUPCOM, SGN's Battalion Awareness Team Program (BAT). This full time team organized at battalion level, monitored by an officer and the battalion chaplain, provides an opportunity for the individual to "talk out" his problem with someone who will listen and is trained to give advice. To enhance this communication atmosphere, a Battalion Coffee House was opened to provide an internal location where men can meet to discuss mutual problems. Scheduled meeting and discussion groups are held at the Coffee House for one-time drug offenders and anyone who has a problem. Company and battalion officers often visit the Coffee House to "rap" with the troops in an effort to keep communication channels open. The Awareness Team, Coffee House, and Involuntary Urinalysis Program have combined to break the back of the drug abuse problem. Toward the end of the report period, however, an increase in drug abuse is evident, stemming from the turbulence of in-country transfer of troops. Troops reassigned from other more isolated areas to this battalion are found to be, in many instances, drug abusers. To counter this threat, involuntary urinalysis tests are being requested on a more frequent basis to identify, detoxify and either return to duty or eliminate users identified a second time.

(3) Discipline, law and order.

(a) 79th Maintenance Battalion. Most disciplinary action in the battalion has been administered within the organization. In those rare instances where more severe punishment was required, it was dealt with in a most efficient and

effective manner.

(b) 91st Composite Service Battalion. AWOL's, Article 15's and court-martials seem to be directly proportional to the drug problem in the units. As drug use increases, a rise in AWOL, Article 15 offenses and court-martials are noted. The most effective tool to control discipline and effect law and order is a strong chain of command down to the lowest echelon. Dependable junior and senior NCO's are particularly essential and to be totally effective, they must have confidence in their officer leaders. A soldier with confidence in his section chief will seek his aid when needed. In essence, using the NCO chain of command combined with the Group's policy of "Standing Closer to Your Men", and the unannounced urinalysis program resulted in a definite decline in the incidence of AWOL, Article 15 offenses, and court-martials within this command.

(c) 185th Maintenance Battalion. The personal efforts of the Commanding General, Saigon Support Command, directed against long pretrial delays were of vital importance in restoring and maintaining good law and order in the unit. This program coupled with the effective measures against the hard drug abuse, drastically reduced the AWOLs, larceny, and serious incidents during the reported period. Article 15 offenses and court-martials were also drastically reduced after an initial upswing associated with the apprehension of drug pushers. However, minor incidents of military discourtesy and poor soldierly appearance persisted. This was caused mainly by deficient supervision by the non-commissioned officers.

(d) 266th Supply and Service Battalion. This command operated under the concept that "discipline in training makes punishment unnecessary". Repeat offenders were dealt with severely, but fairly. Punishments imposed under Field Grade Article 15 were based upon the seriousness of each case. Each offender was fully explained his rights and was given every assistance in seeking legal counsel or making an appeal. There was a distinct increase in Field Grade Article 15's, Special and General courts-martials, and eliminations under Chapter 10, AR 635-212, in comparison with the tenure of the previous commander. This is not a statistic in which to take pride; however, the punitive and administrative actions taken were necessary to stem the increase in disciplinary infractions resulting from the conversion to a peacetime configuration in Vietnam.

1. Logistics.

(1) 91st Composite Service Battalion. Because of rapid restructuring of units during the past several months, i.e. the consolidation of companies and battalions, the management and control of the supply system has become difficult. Often equipment was turned in or laterally transferred so rapidly that only a seasoned, experienced property book officer was capable of maintaining the supply records and property accounts accurately. The rapid reassignment of the accountable officers caused additional hardship in maintaining property accountability. Maintaining the property books of companies at battalion level by qualified personnel, results in the reduction of common posting mistakes. Further, supply economies result since shortages of one unit can be satisfied by overages of

another without extensive supply action. Most importantly, the stability gained through eliminating the replacement of property book officers at company level brought about by short tour turbulence is most economical of time.

(2) 185th Maintenance Battalion. A program of identifying excesses and returning them to the supply system was quickly initiated after assumption of command. During the period over \$1.5 million of equipment was turned in or transferred from the battalion. Consequently, efforts could be more effectively directed toward the maintenance and support of the remaining equipment. Repair parts shortages were a constant problem. While major assemblies could be obtained after follow up action and searches through the Long Binh Depot, organizational parts such as seals and filters that, had they been readily available, might have precluded the loss of the major assembly, were extremely difficult to obtain. Parts kits to repair direct exchange items were also almost non-existent. This situation was compounded by project LIMIT, an ICCV project to reduce procurement of supplies from CONUS. The item manager could recognize the importance of procuring engines and transmissions for combat vehicles but would backorder priority 12 requisitions for replenishment of the low value repair parts, the lack of which ultimately caused the loss of an engine or transmission. Had adequate PLL's been maintained by the supported units and replenishment requisitions been filled by being referred to CONUS, many costly direct support replacements of major assemblies could have been prevented. Combat units, such as the 2nd Squadron, 11th ACR, ultimately resorted to the use of O2 requisitions and REDBALL priorities on a routine basis. On one occasion two each gas caps for the M551 AARAV (Sheridan) were placed on REDBALL priority requisitions. A Material Release Expediter (MRE) on the battalion staff was totally dedicated to hand carrying these priority requisitions through the ICCV and through the Long Binh Depot when parts were found to be in the Depot. An MWO consisting of twelve split line bolts, each costing less than twenty cents, could not be obtained when requisitioned through the ICCV for CONUS referral; hence, approximately six M551 transmissions, each costing in excess of \$8,000 were replaced each month to support 27 Sheridans in the 2/11th ACR. For lack of low cost secondary items, expensive controlled substitution and cannibalization became routine means of repair parts acquisition.

(3) 266th Supply and Service Battalion.

(a) Labor. Local national labor was a necessity in order to accomplish the mission, however, qualified employees were difficult to find. Problems arose from failure to work and continuous thievery on the part of the local nationals. It requires four Vietnamese laborers to equal the daily work output of one good soldier. Further, to accomplish any work, the local nationals had to be closely supervised. As a rule, the contributions of the local national labor force could only be described as marginal.

(b) Maintenance. The importance of 1st and 2nd echelon maintenance in this battalion cannot be over-emphasized. Yet, this is one area this command feels never reached its potential. The necessity to keep mission essential vehicles on the road in a safe condition is evident if the mission is to be accomplished. The materiel handling equipment, 5 ton trucks, propane delivery trucks, and other special automotive equipment must be continuously maintained

at the organizational level as well as backed up by a vigorous support maintenance program. In an effort to obtain the maximum benefits of the limited mechanical talent and expertise of the battalion, the motor pools of each company were consolidated into one large motor pool under the personal supervision of the Battalion Motor Maintenance Warrant Officer. This consolidation immediately proved successful in that the overall deadline rate decreased and priority could be given where needed. However, command supervision by each company commander was diluted to the extent of the degree of maintenance being performed on his unit vehicles, while he retained responsibility for the preparedness and safety of his vehicles. The consolidation is still suffering growing pains, but the advantages attained to date provide the incentive to continue the current program of consolidation.

(c) Construction. Continual improvement of the battalion billet and operational areas was characteristic of the report period. Upgrade of the troops billets, renovation and painting of the Battalion Chapel, improvement of the consolidated mess hall, renovation of the non-commissioned and officers clubs, construction of a covered patio adjacent the NCO club for use by enlisted personnel, and construction of a Coffee House are specific examples of accomplishments during the period.

j. Materiel. 185th Maintenance Battalion. The M551 Sheridan was a very costly item to support in terms of repair parts, shop time, and manpower dedicated to obtaining repair parts. The evaluation of the Sheridan has been thoroughly documented by AMC and will not be dwelled upon herein. It is sufficient to say that the support costs associated with this sophisticated piece of equipment were not repaid by its combat effectiveness. As a general statement, the maintenance of equipment suffered because of an over responsive supply system in Vietnam prior to 1969. Aimless habits of maintenance were possible because the supply system could replace washouts on a timely basis. With the advent of fund restrictions and drawdowns in Vietnam, commanders were faced with poorly maintained equipment that soon became overaged due to an almost total lack of replacement over a two year period. The Closed Loop System became a mechanism to withdraw excesses from the theater in that the return rate to the theater did not keep pace with the retrograde of unserviceables. Unfortunately, the excess was not always identified and redistributed. Additionally when the customer lost faith in the Closed Loop System he continued to operate critically needed items past their recoverable state.

k. Base operations/defense.

(1) 79th Maintenance Battalion.

(a) Organization and mission. To effectively accomplish its mission in perimeter defense, the 29th General Support Group divided its sector of the perimeter into four subsectors. It is the responsibility of each of the four subsector commanders within the Group to establish a perimeter defense and provide internal security as well as supplementary fighting positions, to stop the enemy forward of the perimeter. The defense mission of the 79th Maintenance Battalion is, to defend Long Binh Post in a subsector of the 29th Group's sector against enemy infiltration, ground or indirect rocket/mortar attack, safeguard

personnel and equipment, and prevent interference with service support operations of subordinate units.

1 The battalion subsector consists of seven bunker/fighting positions, two thirty-six-foot observation towers and approximately seventy auxiliary fighting positions, which provide maximum security for its subsector of responsibility.

2 Manning requirements are in accordance with current SOP's, operation orders and policies and procedures established by the 29th General Support Group.

3 To enhance the effectiveness of the battalion's security forces, several techniques are utilized:

a To insure reliable communications with higher headquarters, the 79th Maintenance Battalion believes that a dual communication system with the 29th General Support Group's Sector Operations Center employing wire and radio is absolutely necessary and therefore employed. This dual system of communication is also established between each bunker/fighting position, each tower and the battalion SOC. Lateral communication between bunker/fighting positions and towers is maintained and radio communications is established and maintained between the reaction force and the battalion SOC and the perimeter bunkers and towers are made every thirty minutes and communications checks between the battalion SOC and the 29th General Support Group's SOC are made as directed by the Group's NCS.

b The battalion believes that in order to have an effective and efficient guard force, the guards must be proficient, knowledgeable, and possess an attitude of professionalism and esprit de corps. To ascertain proficiency, a weapons qualification program has been established. This program insures that each perimeter guard is qualified and familiar with each weapon at his disposal in accordance with current SOP's.

c To insure that the battalion perimeter guards are especially knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities, three permanent Sergeants of the Guard are utilized. This policy has proven to be highly effective in obtaining the desired results.

4 At various times the 79th has undertaken operations to improve security/perimeter defense as appropriate. One such project completed by the 79th was the clearing of vegetation in front of the bunkerline. The initial plan was to clear fields of fire for the 79th subsector. When the operation was completed and in a limited amount of time, the 79th had cleared fields of fire out to 500 meters beyond the first strand of concertina for the entire 29th Group's sector of about 2450 meters, minus a small swampy section which was impractical to clear. This operation, which took place just prior to Tet of 1972, was further extended for security purposes to the POL Tank Farm and various other areas of immediate concern inside the bunkerline, i.e., around Sanford Army Airfield. No incidents involving enemy activity occurred in the 79th Maintenance Battalion's subsector.

(2) 91st Composite Service Battalion. The base operations and defense are almost exclusively limited to the defensive perimeter bunkerline complex. The upkeep of such a complex is an operation in itself. Use was made of wire barriers and obstacles were employed, covered by early detection devices. These barriers were reinforced by both small weapons and M18 (Claymore) anti-personnel mines. To provide the best defense, maximum early warning and detection are desired and several projects were undertaken to supply these. Of prime concern were those directed toward insuring good observation and fields of fire. The first thing that was done was to burn as much of the vegetation as possible using contaminated DFM as fuel. Following the burning, bulldozers cleared the area and to guarantee maximum delay in the regrowth of vegetation, the immediate area was penaprimed, using a mixture of approximately 55 barrels of penaprime and 2,000 gallons of contaminated DFM. This amount provided cover for an area approximately 55 by 375 square meters, depending on the texture of the soil. The basic element in the base defense, is the same as in any operation--"the individual soldier"--keeping him both physically and mentally alert. The primary factor in the guard's alertness is considered to be proportional to the amount of activity which occurs on the bunkerline. His nature is such that when no significant action occurs he tends to be more complacent in his guard duty. Another problem was the combat effectiveness of those troops who man the perimeter. In most cases, these were support troops who had been schooled primarily in their technical MOS's rather than in individual combat training. Thus the familiarization and training the soldier was also a time consuming task, since he had little or no infantry oriented training since AIT or even BCT. Extensive training programs had to be undertaken, in the form of both classroom training and practical exercises to improve the combat reaction of the men. Another consideration which primarily is related to the individual soldier was the actual method of scheduling i.e., the length of reliefs. Ordinarily it would be expected that the length of the relief the harder it would be for a man to stay awake and alert. However, it was discovered that the psychological side of the soldier proved the opposite. When the men were posted on a six-hour shift as opposed to two three-hour shifts, fewer were found asleep. The reason for this was essentially two fold; (1) the guards knew they had only one shift scheduled to which he was more receptive and (2) he had more time off because of fewer relief changes, which also provided an uninterrupted six-hour period, during which he was able to rest.

(3) 185th Maintenance Battalion. The 29th General Support Group's section of Long Binh Post perimeter was a clear validation of the axiom, "The unit does what the Commander checks". The Group and Battalion Commanders' personal attention to the perimeter made the 29th Group section clearly that best at Long Binh. The physical condition of the bunkers, wires, flares, claymores, etc., was as good as, if not better than, the defenses at the fire support bases and base camps of the supported combat units.

(4) 266th Supply and Service Battalion. During the reporting period, this battalion was responsible for maintaining and manning a specified number of bunkers on the Long Binh perimeter defense. Additionally, although construed as being interior posts, certain bunkers had to be manned and maintained at the Dong Nai Class III Barge Site and the Long Binh POL Tank Farm. The requirement for guard necessitated enlisted personnel performing guard varying from once every 2½ nights during the peak personnel shortage to once a week during the

"up to strength" period. The frequency of guard duty coupled with the absence of combat action rendered the guard function detrimental to morale. It was a continuing problem to motivate guard personnel to accept the necessity and importance of their job. It was noted, however, that during periods of increased alert, such as national elections and Tet holidays, that the guards performed with increased esprit and the morale was noticeably higher. Physical improvement of the perimeter defense is one area in which the battalion takes great pride. Additionally, defense of other critical areas such as the Dong Nai Barge Site and the Long Binh POL Tank Farm have been drastically improved. Vegetation in the wire has been reduced or eliminated, additional concertina wire has been employed, the perimeter wire has been laced with trip flares, additional lighting has been erected and reaction forces have been trained in small unit tactics and are ready to reinforce any of these areas in the event of an attack.

1. Civil affairs.

(1) 79th Maintenance Battalion. Both HHD and the 147th LEM Co., sponsored orphanages on a voluntary basis and during off duty time. This program has been very active and productive for this battalion. The 147th provided playground equipment, built in their own time, and a big brother type operation. The personnel from the 147th invited the children to Thanksgiving dinner in the battalion dining hall, and on numerous occasions had the children out to the "Go Cart" races held at the battalion race track. HHD started its program on 1 December 1971 and was instrumental in providing a much happier Christmas season for these children. The detachment provided Christmas trees, candy, decorations, toys, and piasters to the orphanage.

(2) 185th Maintenance Battalion. The concentration of the mission and the consideration of the Battalion limited the battalion's contribution to civil affairs to voluntary contributions to the Group's "Dollars for Scholars" fund and holiday meals for local national workers and families.

(3) 266th Supply and Service Battalion. During the report period, the battalion was engaged in many civic actions. In fact, this battalion practically administered the entire Saigon Support Command Civic Actions Program. Among the battalion's major project completions and accomplishments were:

(a) Construction of an "ARVN widows" housing complex at the 3rd ARVN Ranger Compound.

(b) Construction of a school in the village of Tam Hiep.

(c) Construction of a school in the village of Tra Co.

(d) Providing English instructors for classes at surrounding towns and villages.

(e) Monthly contributions to the "Dollars for Scholars" program which provided monies for Vietnamese children to attend school. Total contributions during the reporting period were approximately \$2,000.00.

(f) Construction materials were provided when available to assist in improvements in Tam Hiep and Tra Co hamlets.

(g) Monetary contributions, food, clothing, and buildings materials were provided the 3rd ARVN Ranger Group when a fire destroyed a great number of their dependent quarters.

5. Relationships with Host Nation Forces/Government. As mentioned in paragraph 41, above. In addition to the following comment for the 79th Maintenance Battalion. Relations with members of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam have been extremely harmonious throughout the reporting period. The battalion has worked quite closely with ARVN personnel even to the point, as indicated previously, of having their inspectors physically present in our maintenance shops. A liaison officer from the 80th ARVN Depot is physically located in the battalion materiel office. This action has contributed materially to the outstanding working relationship.

6. Relationship with Third Nation Forces.

a. 79th Maintenance Battalion.

(1) The battalion has at various times provided maintenance support to ROK armed forces within Vietnam. In every case relations have been exceedingly cordial and no problems have been encountered.

(2) During redeployment of Increments V and VI of the Royal Thai Army, the battalion worked very closely with the Thais in providing maintenance, Keystone and retrograde support. In every case relations were exceedingly cordial and left ~~nothing~~ to be desired.

b. 91st Composite Service Battalion. This command has provided support to the Koreans, New Zealanders, Australians, and Thais. In all cases we received complete cooperation from their maintenance and supply personnel. It must be noted that as a general rule these third nation forces were using maintenance and supply systems and procedures very similar to those employed by the US forces. This made coordination and handling of their requirements as routine as those from US units.

c. 185th Maintenance Battalion. The battalion supported a small Phillipine constabulary force and small Republic of Korea units in MR III. This support experienced few problems in that their equipment consisted of current models of standard US Army equipment.

7. Areas in need of Increased Emphasis:

a. 185th Maintenance Battalion.

(1) Non-Commissioned Chain of Command. The "back bone of the Army" is weak in Vietnam. Accelerated promotions have provided commanders inexperienced young officers up to the grade of Captain and young NCO's in the grades E-5

and E-6. The remaining experience in the company is vested in the older E-6 through E-8. While these "older hands" can certainly point to the erosion of their authority and responsibilities in the late fifties and early sixties, the truly professional NCO still finds plenty of responsibility -- it's heaped upon him by his fellow NCO's. The inexperienced junior NCO's and officers look to these experienced cadre to show the way. When the older NCO fails to correct obvious faults or fails to assume a 24 hour responsibility for the enlisted men under his supervision and instead heads for the NCO club at 1700, the junior NCO either follows suit or gives up in disgust. The junior officer would back the NCO if the NCO would take the first step. There is still truth to the fact that NCO's lead men and train young officers. NCO's are going to have to perform or be relieved for inefficiency -- the professionalism of a small US Army leaves no room for deadwood. The "Generation Gap" between the average soldier and the older NCO (and officer) is a real one. Studies have shown that respect, both ways, can bridge that gap -- respect of the individuality of the soldier by the NCO, and respect of the professional competence of the NCO by the soldier. The older NCO (and officer) must be professionally competent. The NCO chain of command in the 185th Maintenance Battalion did not drastically improve by 1 February 1972. This was due in part to the constant shuffling of NCO's associated with the commodity loading, consolidation, and accelerated reassignments.

(2) Billets. The 185th HASC moved into the present billets in April 1971. At that time many billets did not have wiring. Nevertheless, the billets were occupied and the troops wired the billets, often times using extension cords and any other wiring or fixtures that could be "scrounged". Consequently, the wiring is a definite fire hazard. Job orders to Pacific Architect and Engineering have been outstanding since April 1971. Surveys were made and preliminary work started, then the job was stopped. Meanwhile the fluctuating unit strength of the unit (190 in December, 320 in January) has required closing billets only to reopen them a short time later. While the billets were closed, fixtures and wiring had been stripped by the troops to provide more adequate lighting in the occupied buildings. The buildings were reopened and the troops again replaced the pilfered wiring with inadequate and improperly installed materials.

b. 266th Supply and Service Battalion.

(1) Improvement of troop billet areas.

(2) Chain of Command. This command has not been able to totally bridge the gap between the E-5 and E-6 grades, this presents a wide communication gap in the chain of command. This gap is caused by various reasons. Age is important in that many of the E-6's are of the "old Army" or "lifer" image, whereby the young E-5 in most instances is under a two year or three year enlistment and has "nothing in common" with the senior NCO's. He would rather associate with junior enlisted men. Alcohol is another cause. Many of the old NCO's resort to the use of alcohol on a nightly basis, whereby the younger enlisted men are more likely to relate to drug abuse. The senior NCO is not willing to rap with the E-5 regarding the merits or demerits of alcohol versus the use of marihuana. Education is another cause. Many of the young E-5's today possess better formal education than the senior NCO's. Another gap in the chain of command is the junior officer.

In most instances, the junior officers performed satisfactorily. There are, however, cases where the junior officer resists enforcing discipline and regulations among his troops. The hair-mustache-sideburn problem is an example of this. The young officer sympathizes with the enlisted men because he, the officer, is also a member of current society in which long hair is in vogue. The stretch in time between promotion from 1st Lieutenant to Captain will assist in alleviating the problem of the immature and inexperienced Company Commander who has little concept of what a commander is or what he does.

8. Conclusions.

a. That all of the subordinate battalions within the 29th General Support Group accomplished their myriad of missions in an outstanding manner.

b. That the single most serious problem encountered during the report period was that of DRUG ABUSE and the accompanying turbulence created by drug abuse, i.e., muggings, barracks thievery, fights, etc. That problem has virtually been eliminated through the implementation of the Involuntary Urinalysis Program and the support from higher headquarters in ridding the command of multiple offenders.

c. That personnel turbulence is inherent in a 12 month tour, however, due to the drawdown of US forces in Vietnam personnel turbulence during the last half of the report period has created additional morale and operational problems.

d. That this command, although hampered by assigned mission tasks without authorized personnel slots, was able to effectively perform the operational and security missions and constantly improve support to its customers. Accountability, security, customer support, organization and supervision of each operational class of supply was upgraded and improved during the report period.

e. That although the performance of the non-commissioned officer and junior officer was above average in most instances a communications gap is present between the E-5 and E-6 grades caused by age, differing ideologies (drugs vs alcohol) and education; and many junior officers relate to the enlisted personnel of the same age to the extent that they hesitate to enforce regulations or assume the superior to subordinate leadership role.

f. That it is evident during the reversion to a peacetime configuration, that such things as logistics accountability is being observed more closely. This is evidenced by the recent emphasis of metering POL products which had been manually gauged or estimated prior to this time.

g. Many of the discipline and morale problems associated with Vietnam today are related to boredom -- the lack of job satisfaction. Employing the right number of properly trained and supervised men in a meaningful job will directly reduce drug abuse, Article 15 offenses, and other related problem areas.

h. That although mission improvements and upgrading has been continuous,

there is much work still left to be done and the mission continues.

9. Lessons Learned.

a. Operations. Due to the physical separation of the 266th Battalion from its logistical support activities, it was necessary to closely monitor and supervise these activities and customer support from the battalion operations office. During most of the report period an officer, reporting directly to the battalion S-3, was assigned as LSA Liaison Officer and was tasked to insure that the LSA needs were met, that convoys were organized and on time, that local nationals at the LSA sites were paid and that customers supported by the LSA's were personally contacted on a weekly basis. This officer was essential in insuring customer satisfaction and was able to prevent many problems from occurring. It is highly recommended that in future logistical support planning where subordinate units are widely scattered that an officer be tasked to monitor their needs and support. Further, nothing substitutes for getting out to the supported units and talking to the men and commanders. They are the actual tests of the success or failure of the operational mission.

b. Intelligence/Counterintelligence. Comments appear in paragraph 4d and e.

c. Training. Major emphasis was effected at the Group level to encourage subordinate units to train their personnel in the basic combat soldiers skills. Modified Army training type tests were administered to each battalions' reaction force by a Group testing team. Proficiency in individual skills and the forces' improvement in small unit tactics was noticeable.

(1) 79th Maintenance Battalion. In this age of the intended all volunteer Army ~~the~~ individual soldier still attempts to extend his best effort. This is exemplified by the consistently outstanding performance rendered by personnel assigned in this battalion. These soldiers are well briefed by motivated supervisors before assuming their duties. The seriousness and importance of their job is thoroughly explained to them. They are told what to do and how to do it. The results were apparent in viewing their performance.

(2) 91st Composite Service Battalion. Training, especially in a combat environment, is minimal since its scheduling is dependent upon the combat situation and the unit mission which is generally unpredictable. One subject emphasized was the rights and procedures guaranteed the soldiers by the UCMJ. The only other extensive training presented was combat training in small unit tactics and weapons proficiency to prepare the combat service support soldier to fight as infantrymen. This training was found to be both necessary and possible despite scheduling difficulties.

(3) 266th Supply and Service Battalion. It is essential in a turbulent atmosphere such as in Vietnam that on-the-job training be a continuing method by which personnel are trained to accomplish the mission. Further, where security is so necessary, assigned personnel must be kept informed of the situation and trained and familiarized with weapons available to them for their protection and security.

d. Logistics.

(1) Class I Supply. During the report period, the entire Class I activity was reorganized. This reorganization facilitated receipt, storage, issue, accountability, inventory and security of Class I supplies distributed by the battalion. Specific actions taken were:

(a) Multiple entrances and exits into and from the Class I yard were closed, and a one entry/one exit system was established and a guard stationed at each to control traffic, enforce regulations, and spot check supplies.

(b) A one-way traffic flow was established. This facilitated traffic movement through the yard and permitted faster and more efficient service to the customer.

(c) Dry rations were stored by Federal Stock Class or Federal Stock Number, facilitating accountability accuracy and handling.

(d) Plan-o-graphs of the Class I yard were established to facilitate location and efficient use of storage space.

(e) Battery storage was moved inside reefer boxes to lengthen the shelf life of the batteries.

(f) High demand and pilferable items such as sundry packs, C-rations and Long Range Patrol Rations were placed in a warehouse to reduce loss through pilferage and to facilitate accountability.

(g) Lighting was erected in the yard to permit night security and operations.

(h) Condiments were relocated to a larger facility, thus allowing customers easier access and more space in which to select and load condiments.

(i) The Class I yard trash point was relocated to an access road where the garbage pick-up truck could load garbage without having to enter or pass through the Class I yard. This lowered the pilferage rate considerably.

(j) BEFORE and AFTER diagrams of the Class I yard are at Tabs K and L.

(k) Class I support provided also included certain support to nonappropriated fund activities, primarily clubs and messes and small MACV teams. The method of operation lends itself more closely to combination with commissary operations and during the final days of the report period plans are being finalized to transfer this mission to the Newport Commissary.

(1) Problems associated with Class I resulting from depot substitution or shortages and from insufficient transportation assets or reefer units have been discussed earlier in this report. Again, supervision and coordination are key factors in overcoming these problems.

(m) Poor condition of the chill and freeze refrigeration units in the Class I yard resulted in some perishable spoilage. The boxes were continually utilized to capacity and minimally maintained, although during the period of the report the maintenance contractor did an admirable job in providing operable units. Maintenance is the key, whether it be contracted or internal.

(2) Class II and VII Supplies, CIF and CEEF.

(a) Class II and VII. These classes of supply are combined for reporting purposes due to their similarity of handling. During the reporting period many actions were completed at the battalion's Class II and VII activity which enhanced customer support.

1 A new nine digit locator system was implemented enhancing the ability to inventory, account, and locate items in the warehouse.

2 Customers were telephoned after requisitioned supplies were on hand 30 days. This was done to insure that the customer did not need the item before returning it through a retrograde process.

3 As troop strength drastically reduced, inventories were increased in frequency, demand data was closely monitored and unit standdowns were monitored to permit reduction of the authorized stockage list (ASL). When the ASL reaches 1,000 lines, it may be more feasible to cease the NCR 500 operation and initiate a manual accounting system. Current information that the battalion DSU may function as the DSU for MR III supporting the remaining troops in Vietnam and requisitioning directly from off shore sources temporarily suspended planning for operation of a manual system.

4 The stock control function and the Class II and VII storage function are so closely related that it is essential that the officers-in-charge work very closely to insure smooth documentation flow, customer support, and item status follow-up. In fact, if officers are available, it is better to have one officer responsible for both functions with an assistant to manage the activity in each.

5 In addition to the Class II and VII storage facility, a retrograde facility was established to return unclaimed or unserviceable material to supply channels as expeditiously as possible. Although the manning for this function came from already understrength resources, the service performed was efficient and decreased materiel costs. During the last part of the report period when greater emphasis was placed on retrograde, this facility performed outstandingly in expediting packaging and movement of these items for off-shore shipment. An organized retrograde function is a necessary part of a Class II and VII supply activity in a combat zone.

(b) Clothing Issue Facility. This facility provided clothing and equipment issue to newly arrived personnel in Vietnam. It was conveniently located at the 90th Replacement Battalion and operated efficiently during the entire report period. This service could have been more easily supervised and controlled had it been attached to the Replacement Battalion. Since the operation was not authorized

personnel, the Replacement Battalion often was required to provide work details during peak periods. If the Replacement Battalion was tasked to perform this mission, it could schedule and forecast personnel needs based upon incoming and outgoing flight scheduling. Although this operation provided very few problem areas to this command, it could have operated even more efficiently under the Replacement Battalion.

(c) Clothing and Equipment Exchange Facility. This facility provided the service of direct exchange of certain items of clothing and equipment for supported units. There were two major problem areas identified with the operation during the report period:

1 The CEEF was not authorized personnel or equipment to accomplish its mission. MHE's (forklifts) were essential, yet none were authorized. In order to properly man the facility, troops were diverted from other areas such as Stock Control or Class II and VII activity and forklifts were borrowed. This prevented the facility from operating at maximum efficiency and never was completely solved. In an effort to properly supervise the facility, an officer was assigned the primary duty of being the OIC of the CEEF.

2 As the unit drawdowns and standdowns increased, the mission shifted from that of direct exchange to that of turn-in. The facility was not staffed or equipped for the sudden mission shift, thus creating a large backlog. Additional local nationals were hired, but they do not work at maximum efficiency because of their interest in searching every pocket of every garment hoping to find loose coins, cigarettes or anything of value. They also remove zippers from trousers for sale on the local black market. Increased supervision and manning levels toward the close of the report period depleted the backlog to a degree, but continued standdowns are making it difficult to accomplish the mission efficiently. Missions such as this must be provided the needed resources at the outset if the mission is to be accomplished efficiently.

(3) Class III Supply. During the report period Class III supply came under close scrutiny by each succeeding higher chain of command, to include the personal attention of the Deputy Commanding General of USARV. This interest was generated as a result of an audit conducted by the Army Audit Agency. Findings were that excessive amounts of product were being lost, stolen, or unaccounted for due to unknown causes. Subsequent investigation revealed that the accounting system being utilized was deficient and with this impetus a thorough analysis of the entire POL bulk and package distribution system was initiated. In making the analysis, the basic assumption was made that POL products were being pilfered to a great extent. The study revealed numerous suspect areas where fuel products could easily be stolen. Immediate action was taken to close these gaps. The following were the actions taken by location:

(a) Nha Be (entry point of bulk fuel into Vietnam).

1 It was determined that the US Government did not know the capacities of the commercially contracted barges; therefore, when a barge load was ordered there was no way of establishing the quantity involved. Barge capacities are now known and are compared with metered quantities loaded to verify capacity and delivery of product.

2 Different barge types, sized, and configurations were contracted by the commercial oil companies. These barges contained anywhere from one to twenty compartments. It was impossible to insure that barges with one or two compartments were totally drained of all product or if the barge had hidden compartments or false bottoms because inspectors could not observe the entire compartment. To overcome this deficiency contractors provided drawings of each of the contracted barges and agreed to cease the use of one-compartment barges. Further, they agreed to permit periodic inspections by US Government officials of their barges.

3 Members of the 266th Supply and Service Battalion team stationed at Nha Be, were periodically checking the progress of pumping operations. This practice provided an opportunity during interim periods to divert product to other than government barges. Military inspectors were assigned to each of the piers at Nha Be to monitor the entire pumping operation, day and night.

4 By analyzing the most recent shipping documents, it was determined that meter readings were not being noted at the end of pumping operations and that liaison team members were accepting the contractor's statement of the amount of fuel loaded. This was brought to light when it was noted that exact amounts, to the gallon, were loaded for five successive trips. With the capacity of these barges up to 270,000 gallons, it is highly unlikely that the exact amount would be loaded five successive times. Inspectors now take a final meter reading, determine the metered quantity pumped, and compare that figure with the known barge capacity. Only the metered quantity is accepted as accurate.

5 The meter calibration method of each commercial company was inspected. It was discovered that each company was calibrating flow meters, but against standards established by the company and each had a different standard. The contractors have agreed to standardize their calibration methods and permit periodic verification by US inspection teams.

6 The thoroughness of the gauging technique was suspect in that it was a manual system and was only being performed on one compartment of multi-compartment barges. To correct this, a system was established whereby the entire gauging technique, to include water cut, is now taken in each compartment of each barge. Further, due to the human error probability of this manual technique, two independent gaugings are taken by a separate liaison team members and compared for accuracy. Also a one inch tolerance was established for water level readings between Nha Be and Dong Nai. In other words, if water cuts differ in excess of one inch between the two locations, the product shipment would not be accepted.

7 There was no US Government observation of the barge while it was enroute from Nha Be to the Dong Nai POL Barge Site and the travel time historically varied between four and ten hours. This time variance offered many unexplained delays and opportunities for pilferage. To overcome this, CID agents in conjunction with 4th Transportation Command utilized river craft to begin making random observations of suspect barges thus reducing or eliminating opportunities for pilferage.

(b) Dong Nai POL Barge Site.

1 Former procedures permitted the barge captain, usually a local national, to hand carry the delivery documentation from Nha Be to Dong Nai. This offered the opportunity to alter recorded figures or substitute entire documents. This was alleviated by having the Nha Be liaison team radio the necessary information to the barge site. The information is compared with that listed on the documentation presented by the barge captain with differences being a cause for rejection of the shipment.

2 Barge captains, it was determined, from time to time attempted to depart the barge site without totally stripping (off-loading) the product. Bribe attempts have been made by barge captains with US military personnel assigned to the barge site. In order to minimize this, barge site personnel now notify the company commander when a barge is ready to be released. The company commander randomly checks to see if the barge is empty by sending an officer to the barge site to inspect the vessel.

3 Manual gauging techniques were faulty and amounts received questionable, thus flow meters and pressure gauges were installed. These meters provided accurate readings and are invaluable in checking the amounts of product received.

(c) Long Binh POL Tank Farm. POL tankers being loaded at the truck fill stand were being credited with receiving 5,000 gallons of fuel, when in many instances, the tankers already had product aboard. Thus, monthly inventory adjustment reports continually revealed overages. Gauge sticks have been employed and actual amounts pumped are now being recorded. Further, meters have been repaired for this operation also, and will be operable as soon as electrical power is wired to them.

(d) QL-15 Retail POL Outlet. It was determined that customers were stealing products from the government by diverting fuel into containers other than the tanks of their vehicles or by making multiple daily visits to the outlet to fill their tanks; then leaving the post, siphoning the tank, selling the fuel, and returning for another tank load. This was minimized by having the customer stop upon entering the yard, signing for his fuel, and having his trip ticket stamped. Stamping the trip ticket provides a double check -- it provides the guard at the exit gate evidence that the driver has signed for his fuel and also indicated when a customer has visited the yard more than once that day. Drivers returning for multiple fill-ups will not be served until their reasons or needs have been justified.

(4) Class IX Supply.

(a) Maintenance of PLL's.

OBSERVATION -- Command emphasis on maintenance of PLL's is still lacking in most units supported by this command. This resulted in a tremendous hardship on the command, particularly in support of its major customers. The units wanted and expected immediate fill of its' requisitions; however, the Class IX supply system could not respond accordingly. A study of the situation revealed that most of the parts required had a sufficient number of demands to qualify for addition to PLL's but in fact were not added. Had these fast moving critical

parts been stocked on PLL's they would have been immediately available to that unit and normal requisitions could have been filled by Depot on a routine basis. Failure of the units to maintain adequate PLL's resulted in this command establishing an intensive management program to monitor all repair parts required by those units. This required three men to manage the program, and uncounted hours expended by senior officers daily. However, the most significant point was the high deadline rates reflected by the units. The criticality of the situation was discussed frequently with the customer unit CO and his representatives with negative results until this command unilaterally established PLL's for the customer.

CONCLUSION -- Failure to maintain adequate PLL's resulted in unnecessary degradation on the owning unit's readiness, and hardships for the support unit and the Depot which had to manage these parts on an exception basis.

RECOMMENDATION -- This problem is a universal one and there is no simple solution to it. USAREUR has a system in being which has the mechanized Tech Supply activity prepare and update all customer PLL's periodically, based on customer's requisition. This sounds like the solution, however, it is still dependent upon the customer who must initiate requisitions for additions and turn in parts which were deleted. The system should be established world wide if it is proven to be effective. In the interim, however, additional command emphasis must be placed on maintenance of PLL's. This equipment must come from the customer unit, not the support unit. The support unit should naturally provide all the technical assistance required.

(b) Variances in on-hand balances of the ABF.

OBSERVATION -- Many problems have been encountered in the support received from the supply system. Supply support received has not been timely, i.e., parts on-hand in the Depot less than one mile away from the DSU would take anywhere from several weeks to several months to obtain. If the ABF listed an on-hand balance it took several weeks for the MRO to be printed, released to storage, picked and prepared for customer pick-up. If the ABF reflected zero balance, the requisition would be passed, even though parts were physically on hand in the Depot. Knowing there was a great variance in on-hand balances listed on ABF's and physical on-hand balances, material readiness expeditors (MRE) were appointed by customers and employed to locate items, advise the appropriate item manager and request MRO's be cut so the items could be released. Many item managers, for various reasons, resisted the MRE system and complicated the situation by not accepting the MRE's word that the stock was actually on hand. They would request storage to conduct a special inventory and would not print the MRO until the inventory quantity was posted to the ABF. This would consume from several days to several weeks, and would probably never be accomplished if the MRE's did not continually follow up with item managers. The volume of items on hand which were listed on ABF was so great that even MRE's could not keep up with the requisitions. The more actions that MRE's took, the less time the item manager had to manage his routine work. In self-defense, the item managers made life very difficult for MRE's in order to limit the number of hand carries he was required to process. On one occasion, hand carries were completely stopped. It took a great deal of coordination at the general officer level to reinstate the system to provide minimum essential requirements.

CONCLUSION -- It is obvious that item managers do not have the visibility they need to conduct operations. There is either a document time lag or an inadequate inventory procedure causing managers to work with inaccurate ABF's. Until supply managers can obtain timely and accurate information, customers will suffer and money will be wasted passing requisitions to CONUS for parts which are already in-country. Additionally, item managers will continue to be hampered by MRE's and commanders until they find a way to solve this problem.

RECOMMENDATIONS -- That in order to solve the immediate problem item managers accept the word of MRE's and release the items immediately. This would not take up time counting an item already known to be on hand thereby freeing storage personnel to conduct routine inventories on a systematic basis. Additionally, item managers would not waste time following up on the actions. That immediate action be taken to determine whether inaccurate ABF's are a result of time lag in posting, or a matter of inaccurate inventories. Upon identification of the problem the solution will be obvious.

(c) Closed - Loop Program.

OBSERVATION -- The Closed-Loop Program was established to intensively manage fast moving, critical major items and components. Two major problems existed in the program. One problem, as in the case of radios, was that the number of receipts of repaired items was always less than the number evacuated for repair. It is understood that this was done intentionally to reduce the number of radios in-country, since there had been continuous troop drawdown and there was an extremely large amount of excess on hand. The concept had a great deal of merit, however, it was difficult to convey this to the customer who was in dire need of his communications capability and was likely as not to have no excess. The fallacy in the concept was that individual customer requirements were not considered and it was difficult to get the in-country excesses turned in to offset the shortage resulting from the closed-loop system. The second problem which existed dealt with major components, i.e., engines. Prior to November 1971, SSC managed the Closed-Loop Program. Under its management, frequent inventories of closed-loop items conducted and the program ran quite smoothly. In November 1971, ICCV assumed stock control responsibility for the Depot and management of the Closed-Loop Program. This required MRE's to bring requisitions to item managers at ICCV. The item managers received the ABF and in many cases the required items were reflected to be at zero balance. In the majority of cases the MRE would locate the items in storage and advise the item manager, however, the item managers would not accept the word of the MRE and would direct a special inventory, wait until the ABF was posted and then prepare the MRO. This took from several days to more than a week.

CONCLUSIONS -- (1) In the case of the radios there were excesses in-country and action was required to reduce the quantity. However, the method used placed using units, which did not have excesses on hand, in an extremely critical situation. The problem was alleviated significantly when the troop withdrawal schedule was accelerated, however, many units were affected seriously for several months. (2) In the case of the major components, it is apparent that closed-loop items were not intensively managed by ICCV item managers but were handled on a routine basis. It was also apparent that had ICCV conducted frequent inventories

and posted ABF's in a timely manner the routine handling would have been sufficient.

RECOMMENDATIONS -- (1) That the true solution to elimination of excesses is a command problem and should be resolved through command emphasis, not by a unilateral decision to arbitrarily remove items which were job ordered to a DSU by a customer. (2) That the Army eliminate so-called intensively managed programs, which change names periodically, and receive a great deal of lip service but are handled routinely, and concentrate upon management of the standard supply system which has been designed to satisfy requirements in an effective manner.

(d) Demand Criteria.

OBSERVATION -- This command supported a major combat unit in MR III which frequently conducted tactical operations. Under the circumstances there was a great deal of wear and tear on its equipment. The established supply system, for various reasons, could not satisfy the repair parts requirements to support this unit. A decision was made to add to the DSU's ASL any part for a combat vehicle or artillery piece which had one demand in 180 days. The normal criteria for addition to an ASL was six demands in 180 days. This solution to the problem proved to be highly successful since the unit's deadline rate decreased considerably shortly after implementation. Unfortunately only two months experience was gained because the tech supply mission was transferred to another activity. Just prior to the transfer of the tech supply mission, consideration was being given to doubling the requisition objective (RO) of all combat vehicles and artillery parts since the one demand in 180 days criteria did not affect the stockage of high demand items.

CONCLUSION -- Units actively engaged in combat operations require a more responsive supply system to maintain combat effectiveness than units in static operations.

The basic supply system can be modified by changing the criteria for addition of items to the ASL and by adjusting RO's for parts peculiar to specific end items and situation. Since this was a mechanized DSU the special stockage criteria for the unit was managed manually. However, it is felt that the NCR 500 could be programed to accomplish this action with minimum effort.

RECOMMENDATION -- That an NCR 500 program be written which would be capable of computing different RO's for parts peculiar to any given end item.

(e) Maintaining Accurate Dues-in Files.

OBSERVATION -- Inaccurate reconciliation of the dues-in file with a supporting depot results in a high zero balance rate and low customer satisfaction.

CONCLUSION -- Improper reconciliations with a supporting depot result in an invalid dues-in file. A tech supply and depot cannot insure adequate stockage at the tech supply unless the dues-in file coincides with valid requisitions.

RECOMMENDATION -- That reconciliation procedures between depot and tech supply functions be reviewed for adequacy and proper implementation.

(f) Reconciliation of Direct Exchange (DX) Dues-out.

OBSERVATION -- Supported units do not reconcile DX dues-out on a monthly basis as required by USARV Supplement 1 to AR 750-12.

CONCLUSION -- Due to the high rate of turnover and non-standard procurement of DX items, many customers retain dues-out files from a DX facility when the DX item is no longer required. This situation precluded many customers with valid requirements for DX items from obtaining those items in an acceptable length of time.

RECOMMENDATION -- That command emphasis be placed on supported units to insure compliance with reconciliation procedures.

(5) Services.

(a) Graves Resistration. A Graves Registration Point was operated by the 624th Supply and Service Company during the report period. Numbers of remains processed declined proportionately with the decline of US combat activity. During the course of the report period this command recommended that the GR mission be terminated and that remains be transported directly from the 24th Evac Hospital to the Saigon Mortuary. The recommendation was not favorably considered. It is again the opinion of this commander that due to the declining number of remains processed, that the GR point is a holding area only and that eight soldiers are devoted to performing tasks which could easily be performed at a centralized mortuary operation already existing.

(b) Laundry. During the period laundry operations were commercially contracted and this battalion operated two machines only - one each at Phan Thiet and Bao Loc. No significant problem areas were encountered in the operation.

(6) Maintenance.

(a) General Support. To effectively and efficiently accomplish general support maintenance missions, it is essential that ready access to the supporting supply system be available. It is preferable that a tech supply be organic to the maintenance battalion. In the absence of this, as was the case with the 79th Maintenance Battalion, it is essential that material release expeditors be authorized and assigned in a quantity consistent with assigned maintenance workloads.

(b) Direct Support.

1 91st Composite Service Battalion.

a Functionalization.

OBSERVATION -- TO&E's for maintenance units are established for a "type field army" in conventional warfare. They are allocated on the basis of a particular number per field army. In a conventional type war with known boundaries the TO&E's are highly practical. However, in the framework of unconventional war, as in Vietnam, where many supported units are dispersed in isolated locations covering more than a thousand square miles, the personnel and equipment authorized

are inadequate and sometimes improper. Supported units and densities continually change unlike during conventional warfare where the DSU's remain in support of the customers. Due to the wide dispersion of units and the distances they are located from the DSU's, it is infeasible for them to evaluate equipment to the DSU's. Therefore, a great deal of on-site maintenance is required. The limited number of skills available in each TO&E does not provide sufficient depth to provide the amount of on-site maintenance required by all the dispersed units. Submission of MTO&E's is impractical as a solution for this situation because of the time required for approval and the fact that supported units and densities change faster than an MTO&E can be approved. To alleviate this problem each maintenance battalion in this command was commodity loaded. That is, like personnel resources and associated equipment from each maintenance unit were transferred to one unit. This resulted in one unit's support wheeled vehicles, another tracked vehicles and armament, and another QM, engineer and power generation equipment. Consequently, a unit had the depth to perform the numerous on-site jobs and still maintain a capability in the main shop. An additional benefit derived from commodity loading was centralization of shop stock. This eliminated the possibility that one unit would have repair parts in stock which were critically required by another unit supporting the same commodity. Although the system worked well, personnel accountability was complex caused by large numbers of personnel being attached among the maintenance units.

CONCLUSION -- Operations in an environment where a great deal of on-site maintenance is required for widely dispersed units is highly conducive to commodity type support rather than one stop service. However, utilization of MTO&E's as authorization documents makes personnel and equipment accountability difficult.

RECOMMENDATION -- To preclude having units constantly submit MTO&E requests or cope with extremely difficult personnel and equipment accountability, it is recommended that TO&E 29-610 G Detachments be organized and made available for attachment to DSU's as required.

b MACV Advisory Team Support.

OBSERVATION -- On 17 December 1971, this command assumed the mission of support of MACV Advisory Teams. Many problems were encountered because of the high priority placed on this support and the distance involved to many of the team sites. The normal customer - DSU relationship was not adhered to in this case. Rather than the customer's coming to the DSU with faulty equipment, the DSU was required to go to the customer and provide on-site maintenance. During these on-site maintenance visits it was learned that the teams were not maintaining log books on major items such as vehicles or generators and that many teams had no US military personnel assigned, who were capable of performing organizational maintenance on the on-site equipment.

CONCLUSION -- As a consequence of the above it was necessary for the DSU to accomplish the organizational maintenance as well as the direct support level repair work. The normal DSU staffing does not take into consideration such unusual requirements; hence, shop capability was strained to the utmost and in some rare cases, adversely affected the support given other customers.

RECOMMENDATIONS -- (1) That qualified organizational maintenance personnel be assigned to each MACV Team site so that daily operator preventive maintenance can be performed. (2) That if qualified personnel are not available, MACV personnel be offered an intensive training course in organizational maintenance of common equipment or (3) That MACV Teams be satellited on RVN units for their organizational maintenance support.

c Operator Maintenance of Equipment.

OBSERVATION -- Units in the Republic of Vietnam, because of high priorities and operational necessities, have a tendency to disregard or ignore normal daily operator maintenance. In many cases units will operate a piece of equipment without performing daily PM until the equipment is in such poor condition that it will no longer function. Units then job order the equipment to their DSU for repair. A classic example is one involving a major customer which operated 148 pieces of tracked equipment. During the past ninety days (Dec 71 thru Feb 72) this command replaced 57 engines for that unit. A majority of the engine failures were caused by overheating. Frequent investigations of this subject disclosed each time that most of these failures were caused by operating vehicles with inoperative temperature gauges; with clogged air cleaners, not providing sufficient air to the engine (this also allowed dirt to get into the engine); with clogged radiators, not allowing them to function as designated; with insufficient engine coolant; and without air cleaners, allowing dirt to accumulate in the engine. Correction of any one of the above listed deficiencies would have required minimum time and effort on the part of the operator and saved the government many thousands of dollars in the cost of new engines.

CONCLUSION -- The only course the DSU can take to assist in alleviating this problem is to tighten acceptance inspections and standards. This will reduce the evidence of neglected equipment somewhat and force units to perform organizational maintenance. However, this is obviously a "cure" rather than a "prevention" method.

RECOMMENDATION -- That commanders at all levels place increased emphasis on daily operator preventive maintenance. In so doing, weekly TI's by qualified mechanics should be emphasized and tech assistance road side checks encouraged at all levels starting at the battalion.

d Rebuild of $\frac{1}{4}$ ton Transmissions.

OBSERVATION -- The supply of $\frac{1}{4}$ ton transmissions was critically slow due primarily to the drain on the supply system to satisfy 981 requirements. Moreover, the system required the turn-in of repairables to CC&S which, in turn, transferred them to depot whereupon they were shipped to a contractor for rebuild and returned for issue. The time required for this cycle ran into weeks and even months.

CONCLUSION -- The lack of $\frac{1}{4}$ ton transmissions was causing prolonged and high customer deadline rates of $\frac{1}{4}$ ton vehicles. To alleviate this situation, the DSU undertook to rebuild the transmission using repair kits that were available in the supply system.

RECOMMENDATION -- That command emphasis be applied to reduce the turn-around time for the rebuild of $\frac{1}{4}$ ton transmissions thus eliminating the performance of GS level maintenance in DS activities.

2 185th Maintenance Battalion: Commodity Loading.

a Advantages.

i All related skills were centralized under the control of one shop office, i.e. all turret artillery repairmen are assigned or attached to the 19th Lt Maint Co. Better supervision and on-the-job training could be provided, particularly in view of the shortage of trained officers and NCO's. Without commodity loading the heavy commitment of personnel to perimeter defense would have temporarily stopped work in a given commodity within one company, particularly in an unique skill such as air conditioning repair wherein one repairman is authorized in each company. With commodity loading, the available strength within a given commodity may be reduced by guard commitments but a capability is still retained to perform priority job orders. This became increasingly important as personnel began to depart for CONUS at an accelerated pace without replacement.

ii Repair parts peculiar to a given commodity were consolidated under one shop office. Hence, shops were not in "competition" for critical parts. Controlled substitution of major assemblies was facilitated.

iii Priority of effort and repair parts could be easily directed with all job orders for a given commodity placed under one shop office. In the assignment of customers within a commodity shared by two companies, such as tactical wheeled vehicles, the combat and combat support units were assigned to one company (the 19th Lt Maint Co). Combat service support, contractor, and other non-combat customers were assigned to the other company - again, to facilitate assignment of priority of effort and repair parts.

iv Commodity loading facilitated the consolidation of the battalion's three companies into one company. As personnel strength decreased in a commodity, that commodity was transferred intact (personnel and equipment) to the remaining companies in the battalion and to other units in the Group.

b Disadvantages.

i Once commodity loaded, a company cannot be detached from the battalion and still provide its full TO&E capability without release from attachment of personnel serving in other units and subsequent return of equipment on loan to other units within the battalion and Group.

ii Competition between companies in like commodities can be a very productive stimulus and is lost in commodity loading.

iii Cross attachment is required for a commodity loaded company to deploy a contact team if all commodities are to be repaired by the contact team.

c Conclusion. Commodity loading certainly presented the most flexible

and productive organization for the 185th Maintenance Battalion in its non-divisional support role. Commodity loading could be extensively applied in a divisional unit or in any other maintenance unit with a mission to deploy as a unit and provide direct support in all commodities.

(7) Retrograde/CC&S. In order to adequately plan missions of the complexity and magnitude of Keystone and Retrograde, it is essential that the planning headquarters closely and continually coordinate with the units possessing the implementation skills. The lack of this coordination results in unrealistic scheduling and inefficient employment of the ground unit. Needless delay is then encountered to revise and reevaluate plans and procedures.

f. Other.

(1) Serious Incident Reports. These reports are required when incidents occur as listed in Saigon Support Command Regulation No. 355-2. These reports have a significant impact on the success or failure of a command as they are considered "negative" indicators. This command feels that it is a plus or "positive" indicator when a drug pusher is apprehended or a black marketer is caught -- yet, these are placed in the same category as racial disturbances, stolen vehicles, mutiny, riots or other incidents which can be influenced by the commander. It is conceivable that attempts are made to cover up serious incidents in an effort to avoid the stigma of it becoming a statistical record. If two categories of reportable serious incidents were established, with the "positive" incidents not being considered as part of the overall statistics, the commander would feel less hesitation in reporting them.

(2) Additional missions with no authorized personnel or equipment. In the body of this report it was brought out that the 266th Supply and Service Battalion was tasked with missions without accompanying TOE, MTOE, or TDA authorized personnel or equipment. When discussing personnel shortages with higher headquarters, often the statement would be made that the battalion was "practically up to strength". It is essential to show the impact of such extra missions. The following were missions assigned for which personnel or equipment were not authorized. The strength figures indicated were at their peak during the report period.

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u># OF PERSONNEL</u>
CEEF	18
CIF	21
Dear Cat POL Retail Point	5
NAF Yard	5
Phan Thiet LSA	13
Bao Loc LSA	15
Phu Loi LSA	25
Dong Tam LSA	4
Tay Ninh LSA	4
Tailgate Section	6
Total	116


This means that 116 men were assigned to tasks which were not recognized as authorized slots, therefore, other missions which were recognized as being within the capability of a supply and service battalion suffered. This fact combined with the inherent personnel turbulence of a 12 month duty tour and a guard commitment of approximately 60 men per night affected overall mission accomplishment to an unknown degree. The lesson learned in this instance is that the need for authorized spaces must be recognized at the time the mission is assigned, not when the unit is about to phase out. The company commanders operating in this environment performed remarkably well in successfully carrying out assigned missions.

10. It is inevitable that over a ten month span of command that something of importance may have been omitted from this report. This omission may have occurred because at the time the event seemed to have little or no impact on the mission of the Group or because of a memory lapse. However, the ten month period has been totally interesting, undeniably challenging and personally rewarding.



ADOLPH L. BELSER
Colonel, QMC
Commanding

12 Inclosures



SOUND-OFF PROGRAM

I. PURPOSE AND SCOPE: The purpose of these instructions is to establish the SOUND-OFF (S-O) Program to provide a direct line of communication between enlisted men and all command levels within the Group. The scope of the S-O Program includes all subjects for improvement, recommendations and other matters of concern to soldiers that they wish to call to the attention of commanders, officers, and noncommissioned officers assigned to the Group. This program is not intended to replace normal communication within the Chain of Command.

II. POLICY: It is the Policy of this Group to recognize and respect the confidential nature of personal communications under the S-O program and to furnish prompt, responsive replies.

III. PROCEDURES: SOUND-OFF forms will be located conspicuously throughout the Group. The Forms are designed to enable the men to address the Group Commander, Battalion Commanders and Company Commanders. Individuals submitting a S-O item may select the addressee he wishes to receive the form, by checking the appropriate box on the back of the form. Specific commanders and other leaders may be addressed by using the ATTN lines below the appropriate organization and entering the unit (Bn or Co) designation. Forms, folded and sealed, will be deposited in S-O boxes located throughout the Group. The S-O item will be assigned a number to be placed on the portion bearing the originator's name and the portion bearing the comment. The portion bearing the originator's name will be detached from the form. The S-O item, identified only by the number will be provided to the action activity. The detached portion of the form bearing the enlisted members name will be handled in a secure manner. The action activity will gather all pertinent facts and prepare a reply for the commander or other official to whom the comment is addressed. The action activity will review the proposed reply to assure that it is fully responsive before submitting it to the appropriate commander for signature. Answers will be returned to originators of S-O items in sealed envelopes bearing only the man's name and unit. These will bear no indication that the envelope contains a S-O item. SOUND-OFF drop boxes will be clearly marked with the words "SOUND-OFF" in large block letters.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 79th Maintenance Battalion (GS)
APO US Forces 96384

AVCS MT F

13 November 1971

SUBJECT: Mission

Commanding Officer, HHD, 79th Maintenance Battalion (GS), APO US Forces 96384

Commanding Officer, 567th TC/CC&S Company, APO US Forces 96384

Commanding Officer, 147th Light Equipment Maintenance Company, APO US Forces 96384

Commanding Officer, 632nd Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company, APO US Forces 96384

1. References:

a. Letter; Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Saigon, subject: Letter of Instruction, 79th Maintenance Battalion (GS), dated 26 February 1970.

b. DA Form 2496, AVCA SGN SGS, subject: Mission Assignments for 79th Maintenance Battalion, dated 22 May 1970.

c. Confidential letter; Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Saigon, subject: Realignment of Maintenance Missions (U) dated 22 October 1971.

d. Memorandum for Record; Headquarters, 79th Maintenance Battalion AVCS MT F, subject: Realignment of Maintenance Missions, 23 October 1971.

e. Letter Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Saigon, subject: Office Machine Repair, dated 27 October 1971.

2. The references of paragraph one assign current missions to the 79th Maintenance Battalion. The mission of this battalion falls into four functional areas:

Keystone
Retrograde
Maintenance Support
Perimeter Guard

13 November 1971

3. a. Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 79th Maintenance Battalion.

(1) Commands, exercises technical supervision and controls in the execution of the mission, all combat service support units attached to the battalion. Exercises supervision over and provides support to attached units in matters relating to administration, tactical operations, report preparation and submission, and training.

(2) The Materiel Office Keystone Project Officer is directly responsible for the Keystone mission in MR III and IV.

(3) CO, HHD will provide security forces for perimeter defense as directed.

(4) Other missions as directed.

b. 147th Light Equipment Maintenance Company, (plus 60th Engr Detachment).

(1) Provides DS/GS Maintenance for radio, wire, radar, power generation, electronic instruments, photo, FADAC, HICAP, special electronic devices, office machine repair, recordac and JAG recorders as indicated below.

(2) Provides DS/GS repair to customer list categories A & C (see inclosure one).

(3) Provides DS overflow/GS maintenance to customer list category B.

(4) Provides an ordering officer to monitor the office machine contractor. Receives office machines from customers listed in inclosure one, submits items for repair to the contractor, accepts repaired items from same for the government, and reissues to customers. Category B.

(5) Provides an ordering officer to monitor the calibration contractor. Receive items from customers listed in inclosure one, submits items for repair to the contractor, accepts repaired items from same for the government, and reissues to customers.

(6) Provides support beyond the capability of the Fixed Field Maintenance Facility.

(7) Provides security forces for perimeter defense as directed.

(8) Other missions as directed.

c. 567th Transportation/Collection, Classification and Salvage Company.

AVCS MT F
SUBJECT: Mission

13 November 1971

(1) Operates a collecting and processing point for the receipt, inspection, classification, segregation, disassembly, MQI cleaning, preservation and proper disposition of SCRAM III and IV assets from all units in military regions III and IV, for class VII materiel, except aircraft, ammunition and missiles.

(2) Provides MQI cleaning and preservation service for USADLB excess and Keystone retrograde principal items. Coordinates shipping for all three retrograde sources.

(3) Operates a cannibalization point in accordance with current directives and regulations.

(4) Operates a collecting point for captured weapons.

(5) Maintains the twenty point washrack.

(6) Maintains a processing team at Newport docks to expedite flow of retrograde materiel.

(7) Provides security forces for perimeter defense as directed.

(8) Other missions as directed.

d. 632nd Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company.

(1) Provides DS/GS maintenance capability in automotive, engineer/construction, MHE, artillery, small arms, and limited allied trades. No body fender, paint or instrument capability is available.

(2) Provides DS/GS repair of all USADLB unserviceable repairable assets in its commodity areas for return to depot stocks.

(3) Provides DS overflow/GS support in its commodity areas to customers in category B.

(4) Provides upgrade support beyond the capability of the Fixed Field Maintenance Facility.

(5) Conducts the repair and return program on towed 155mm howitzers for specified units.

(6) Provides security forces for perimeter defense as directed

(7) Other missions as directed.

AVCS MT F
SUBJECT: Mission

13 November 1971


4. Administration:

a. Personnel are assigned or attached for command, administration, and operational control.

b. Supporting units will coordinate with supported units on a regularly scheduled basis. External SOP's will be published and approved by this headquarters prior to dissemination.

c. All official correspondence with higher headquarters will be routed through CO, 79th Maintenance Battalion.

d. Mission repair parts support is provided by Fixed Field Maintenance Contractor.


BRYANT W. RIFE
LTC, OrdC
Commanding

C U S T O M E R L I S T

- A. US Army Depot Long Binh (Depot Stock Only)
- B. 1. 29th General Support Group
 - 79th Maintenance Battalion (CS)
 - 91st Composite Service Battalion
 - 79th Light Maintenance Company
 - 378th Electronic Maintenance Platoon
 - 510th Engineer Company
 - 185th Maintenance Battalion (DS)
 - Headquarters and Main Support Company
 - 19th Light Maintenance Company
- 2. Delta Logistical Support Activity
 - 526th CS Maintenance Company
- 3. 1st Cavalry Division-Airmobile
 - Maintenance Company
- C. 1. Radio 1st Signal Brigade
- 2. Wire C&E Maintenance Facility
- 3. Radar
- 4. Power Generation
- 5. Electronic Instruments 36th Signal Battalion
(meters only)
- 6. Photo MR III & IV
- 7. FADAC
 - 2/11 Arty
 - 1/21 Arty
 - 2/32 Arty
 - 5/42 Arty

8. HICAP

1st Signal Supply Agency
36th Signal Battalion
327th Signal Company
RCC SSA Octopus Topo
STRATCOM Facilities (backup)

9. Special Electronic Devices

1st Australian Tactical Force
3rd Ordnance Battalion
66th Engineer Battalion (TOPO)
114th Aviation Company
120th Assault Helicopter Company
335th Assault Helicopter Company

10. Office Machine

11. Recordac

MR III & VI

12. JAG Recorders

USARV Staff Judge Advocate

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 79th Maintenance Battalion (CS)
APO US Forces 96384

AVCS SG MB F

18 January 1972

SUBJECT: Mission

Commanding Officer
622nd Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company
APO US Forces 96384

1. References:

a. Ltr, this headquarters AVCS SG MB F, dated 13 November 1972, subject: Mission.

b. Msg, USARV AVHDL-MAP, dated 13 October 1972, subject: Critical US Requirements - 5T Trk.

c. Ltr, this headquarters AVCS SG MB F, dated 17 November 1971, subject: Requisition Priorities for Job Orders.

d. Ltr, this headquarters AVCS SG MB F, dated 18 November 1971, subject: Use of GAS Repair Parts for critical US Requirements (Project Code ZON).

e. Msg, USASCS AVCS CM, dated 080753Z Dec 71, subject: Project ZON.

f. Ltr, this headquarters AVCS SG MB F, subject: Controlled Substitution of 5 ton Assets, dated 22 December 1971.

2. This letter is to clarify and confirm verbal instructions issued since reference 1,a. was disseminated.

3. In accordance with directions received by the battalion commander on 8 January 1972, you are relieved of the repair and return mission for 155mm towed howitzers.

AVOS SG MB F
SUBJECT: Mission

18 January 1972

4. Your current automotive missions are in order of priority:

- a. Direct support of 4th Transportation Command 5-ton tractors.
- b. Upgrade of 5-ton tractors from depot stock for issue to the 4th Transportation Command (Project 201).
- c. Production of trailers for RVNLT in the following types and quantities:
 - (1) 1/4 ton 125 ea
 - (2) 3/4 ton 139 ea
 - (3) 1 1/2 ton 101 ea
- d. Combat vehicles
- e. Other 5-ton family vehicles for the 4th Transportation Command Project 981 and depot stock.
- f. Other

5. a. Repair parts requisitions will bear the same priority as that of the DA Form 2407.

b. Project code ZON is assigned for requisitioning repair parts used in the upgrade of 5-ton tractors for subsequent issue to the 4th Transportation Command. IPB 02 may be used for, and will be restricted to, "line stopper" repair parts for vehicles in this category. Other 5 ton assets may be used for controlled substitution to further this project. Items substituted must be replaced with an unserviceable part, and a serviceable part, requisitioned using project code ZON. In no case will an item be reduced below SGRAM III by such substitution.

6. Project code GAS may be used for items repaired for Project 981.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ARMUR S. BRANT
LAI, TC
Asst Adjutant

79TH MAINT BN APO 96384

22 September 1971

SUBJECT: Mission, Functions and Organization of the Materiel Office

1. Mission: This section, under the direction of the Materiel Officer, is responsible for supervision and management of the battalion's technical missions, i.e. Keystone, retrograde and maintenance support.

2. Functions:

a. Planning/Coordination:

(1) Provides advice and recommendations to the commander and staff on technical mission matters, keeps the commander informed of progress, status, requirements and anticipated problems, and recommend action.

(2) Prepares plans and policies for mission operations based on broad guidance furnished by the commander and instructions or information from higher headquarters.

(3) Provides information to, and coordinates with, the operations section on preparation of support plans, relocation of units, utilization of sites and facilities training requirements, and mission assignments.

(4) Compiles and provides information on the capabilities, and limitations of the battalion technical resources.

(5) Conducts visits to higher headquarters, attached units and supported units.

(6) Maintains coordination with adjacent technical units to effect the exchange of maintenance information and the review and comparison of practices and techniques.

(7) Maintains coordination with higher headquarters relative to work-load status, problem areas, priorities, special instructions, repair parts requirements, and disposition of materiel requiring evacuation.

(8) Provides information on characteristics, capabilities and limitations of materiel.

b. Organizing/Directing:

(1) Manages and supervises the battalion technical mission.

(2) Collects and maintains policy, technical information, instructions and guidance from higher headquarters and provides information, policies and procedures to attached units.

(3) Recommends changes to current functional structures as necessary.

(4) Institutes actions to balance workloads among attached units.

(5) Supervises the technical training and cross training of maintenance and maintenance-supply personnel, determines requirements and recommends policies for on-the-job training.

(6) Develops and implements techniques to assist in control of workload in units of the battalion and to improve efficiency and production.

c. Controlling:


(1) Establishes necessary reports and controls to insure proper and successful accomplishment of the battalion mission. Reports are kept to the minimum necessary.


(2) Collects and evaluates reports, and takes appropriate action at battalion level on the basis of information indicated in these data.


(3) Conducts inspections of attached units to determine operational status, work performance and problem areas.

(4) Obtains progress reports on technical training.

3. An organizational chart is attached,



DANIEL M. LITYNSKI
CPT, OrdC
Materiel Officer






o indicates zero strength

79th Maintenance Battalion assigned 29th General Support Group effective 1 November 1971, Saigon Support Command GO#1486 dtd 31 Oct 71 58






* MISSIONS AND RESOURCES TRANSFERRED TO 91ST CS BN.

MISSIONS TRANSFERRED OR TO BE TRANSFERRED TO OTHER UNITS PER USARV OPLAN 208A

% SPACES ONLY, PROVIDED FOR AUGMENTATION OF CC&S/RETROGRADE ACTIVITIES



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 29th General Support Group
APO San Francisco 96491

AVCS SG CO

4 January 1972

ABC Number 6
Operation STAND CLOSER TO YOUR MEN

TO: Commanding Officer, 79th Maintenance Battalion, APO 96384
 Commanding Officer, 185th Maintenance Battalion, APO 96491
 Commanding Officer, 91st Composite Service Battalion, APO 96384
 Commanding Officer, 266th Supply and Service Battalion, APO 96491
 Commanding Officer, HHC, 29th General Support Group, APO 96491

1. Reference, Leadership Conference held at this headquarters on 8 August 1971, I desire the following actions implemented in every company size unit in this command:

a. Each company commander will personally welcome and interview each new arrival using the Home Town News Release blank form as a guide to the interview. The interview should be warm, somewhat informal, and close with a scheduled follow up interview at a future defined date.

b. Unit first sergeants will personally provide an orientation to each new arrival following the commander's interview covering all unit standard operating procedures, and insuring that all personnel and administrative matters are explained in detail. First sergeants will also schedule definite follow up interviews.

c. Battalion commanders will initiate a procedure whereby a personal letter signed by the commander is written to each newly arrived enlisted man's parents or wife, explaining as a minimum the individual's safe arrival, the unit's mission and location, his assigned duties, and his new address. This letter should project your personal interest in the enlisted man and reassure his loved ones. This letter will not be a standard mimeographed letter.

d. Battalion commanders will implement a procedure whereby letters will be sent to families of members of their units regarding awards, promotions and other significant achievements. Letters of condolence will be sent to the families of members of any given unit when appropriate.

e. Battalion commanders will also advise parents or families in the event soldiers are absent without leave.

AVCS SG CO

ABC Number 6 - Operation STAND CLOSER TO YOUR MEN

2. I consider the above actions a beginning, just one small step for the officers and noncommissioned officers of this command to become personally involved with one of our most important missions, that of really taking care of the men assigned to this command. I actively solicit every officer and noncommissioned officer's comments on how best to command our enlisted men through firm positive active leadership.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Adolph L. Belser', with a long, sweeping horizontal line extending to the right.

ADOLPH L. BELSER
Colonel, QMC
Commanding

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 29th General Support Group
APO San Francisco 96491

AVCS SG CO

20 October 1971

ABC Number 20
"SOUND-OFF Program"

TO: See Distribution

1. This command has continually developed a rapport with the enlisted members through initial interviews, personalized attention, and the open door policy. This entire program is titled, "Operation Stand Closer To Your Men." One of our most important goals in this program is effective communication. In furtherance of this goal, a new procedure, appropriately named the SOUND-OFF Program (S-O) has been established to provide enlisted men direct access to the commander. Procedures for implementation and administration of SOUND-OFF are outlined in inclosure 1.

2. SOUND-OFF communications to the commander will receive personal replies. Enlisted men submitting queries to SOUND-OFF will not be identified to any individual except the commander. This is extremely important in order for a SOUND-OFF to be effective. If desired, queries may be directed to any commander or officer in the command. Enlisted men may also elect to personally present their SOUND-OFF queries in lieu of submitting them in writing.

3. Suggestions which give specific solutions and are intended for award consideration should be submitted through the suggestion program.

4. Although the success of this program is dependent upon discerning responses by command representatives, the individual soldier should recognize that this program is not a substitute for the Chain of Command.

5. Commanders will give this ABC the widest possible dissemination within their command.



ADOLPH L. BELSER
Colonel, QMC
Commanding

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